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i 
ABSTRACT           
 
Unquestionably, water maintains a critical role within society. It is precisely this role that 
makes it an attractive target for potential adversaries. As it currently stands, water 
infrastructures are significantly vulnerable to attacks; their risk however, is questionable. 
As such, this work will analyze the security of water infrastructure systems. It will 
discuss the systems involved in the treatment of water and waste water, and how various 
processes can be vulnerable to four main threats: biological, chemical, cyber and physical 
threats. Additionally, this work will challenge the conventional view of terrorism through 
the perspective of Critical Terrorism Studies as a means to discuss how non-traditional 
threats such as privatization and neoliberalization may also be seen as threats. Moreover, 
this work will also explore how each of these threats may be realized, and it will 
furthermore utilize case studies and professional interviews to achieve this. 
 Attacks upon water infrastructure systems are not new. In fact, such attacks have 
been reported as far back as 500 BCE. What is new, however, is the evolving threat 
landscape. Given the convenience of the Internet, a single individual can research almost 
any topic to his or her desire, including vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure 
systems. To add to this, one does not have to search deep into the web to find information 
on how to inflict serious damage. Certainly, the twenty-first century has its prospects, but 
it certainly has its perils as well. This work will attempt to address vulnerabilities, and 
furthermore, what is at stake if nothing remains to be done. 
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FOREWORD           
 
 
This Major Paper fulfills the requirements of the Master of Environmental Studies 
degree by incorporating components of my area of concentration of dangerous 
technology, terrorism, and disaster management with a view to analyze the vulnerabilities 
of modern water infrastructure. Proficiency on this topic requires an understanding of 
current and alternate water infrastructure systems, in addition to their threat sources. 
The nature and role of this major paper is to shed light on the potential threats to 
water infrastructure systems in Toronto, Ontario. This work aims to look deeper into a 
subject that is not publically spoken about, given its sensitive nature. In doing so, it is the 
hope of the author that it dispenses information that provides the reader with a greater 
sensitivity to the traditional and non-traditional threats present within their environment. 
Although the author offers her own assessment in the conclusion of this work, it is hoped 
that this work will also encourage one to draw their own assessment and contribute to the 
security of the water infrastructure. 
Although the objectives for each of the components were predominantly 
completed through coursework and certifications, this Major Paper provided the 
circumstances to explore the topic of terrorism through the two perspectives: 
conventional and critical terrorism studies, and finally, to relate these two perspectives 
back to the three components of the plan of study. 
Two of the components, dangerous technology and terrorism, are addressed by 
analyzing conventional and critical terrorism studies. Later on in this work, they are also 
addressed by analyzing the physical, cyber, chemical and biological threats that exist 
within the current water infrastructure systems.  
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The third component of disaster management is addressed through the lens of 
critical infrastructure protection. Illustrating the systems and identifying the 
vulnerabilities, and moreover analyzing case studies has provided the insight necessary to 
understand the vulnerabilities that currently exist. It has also provided the foundation of 
understanding why water infrastructure is a target of interest to potential adversaries.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS         
 
ACTUS REUS: “The act or omissions that comprise the physical elements of a crime as 
required by statute” (Cornell, 2014, 1). 
 
AVAILABILITY: “Assets can be accessed or used by authorized parties as needed” 
(Conklin, 2011, 77).  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: “Relates to keeping secrets about assets secret” (Conklin, 2011, 77).  
 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: “Critical infrastructure refers to processes, systems, 
facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, 
security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of 
government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected and 
interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national borders. Disruptions 
of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects 
and significant harm to public confidence” (PSC, 2014, 1). 
 
INTEGRITY: “Focuses on preventing unauthorized changes to assets” (Conklin, 2011, 77).  
 
INTERNET OF THINGS: “The Internet of Things represents an evolution in which objects 
are capable of interacting with other objects. Hospitals can monitor and regulate 
pacemakers long distance, factories can automatically address production line issues and 
hotels can adjust temperature and lighting according to a guest's preferences, to name just 
a few examples. Furthermore, as the number of devices connected to the Internet 
continues to grow exponentially, your organization's ability to send, receive, gather, 
analyze and respond to events from any connected device increases as well” (IBM, 
2014). 
 
MENS REA: “The psychological state defining a criminal perpetrator as culpable for 
having committed a crime” (Cornell, 2014, 1). 
 
MITIGATION: “Actions taken to reduce the adverse impacts of an emergency or disaster. 
Such actions may include diversion or containment measures to lessen the impacts of a 
flood or a spill” (EMO Glossary of Terms, 2011). 
 
MULTI-PARAMETER MONITORING:  “Multi-parameter monitoring entails monitoring 
common water quality parameters and then looking for anomalies that may be indicative 
of a water contamination event.  Sensors can include parameters such as chlorine 
residual, total organic carbon, pH, conductivity, turbidity, UV absorbance/fluorescence 
and others“ (Kroll, 2013, 12). 
 
PREPAREDNESS: “Actions taken prior to an emergency or disaster to ensure an effective 
response. These actions include the formulation of emergency response plans, business 
continuity/continuity of operations plans, training, exercises, and public awareness and 
education” (EMO Glossary of Terms, 2011). 
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PREVENTION: “Actions taken to stop an emergency or disaster from occurring. Such 
actions may include legislative controls, zoning restrictions, improved operating 
standards/procedures or critical infrastructure management” (EMO Glossary of Terms, 
2011). 
 
RECOVERY: “The process of restoring a stricken community to a pre-disaster level of 
functioning. This may include the provision of financial assistance, repairing buildings 
and/or restoration of the environment” (EMO Glossary of Terms, 2011). 
 
RESPONSE: “The provision of emergency services and public assistance or intervention 
during or immediately after an incident in order to protect people, property, the 
environment, the economy and/or services. This may include the provision of resources 
such as personnel, services and/or equipment” (EMO Glossary of Terms, 2011). 
 
RISK: “The potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of 
assets and thereby cause harm to the organization. Threat x Probability x Business Impact 
= Risk” (Maniscalchi, 2009, 1). 
 
SCADA AND DCS: “There are two primary types of control systems: Distributed Control 
Systems (DCS), which are typically used within a single processing or generating plant, 
or over a small geographic area; and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, which are used for large, geographically dispersed distribution operations. As an 
example, a utilities company may use a DCS to generate power and a SCADA system to 
distribute it” (Gendron and Rudner, 2012, 49-50). 
 
TERRORISM: “A synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind 
of violence- that which is deliberately perpetrated on civilian non-combatant victims –
played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes” 
(Combs, 2011, 5).  
 
TOXICITY MONITORING: “Toxicity tests are an attempt to measure toxicity in a sample 
by analyzing the results that exposure produces on standard test organisms” (Kroll, 
2013, 11). 
 
VULNERABILITY: “The existence of a weakness, design, or implementation error that can 
lead to an unexpected, undesirable event compromising the security of the computer 
system, network, application, or protocol involved” (Maniscalchi, 2009, 1). 
 
WATER- AS-TARGET FOR ATTACK: “Water supplies can be poisoned; dams can be 
destroyed to harm downstream population “ (Gleick, 2006, 4-5). 
 
WATER-AS-TOOL FOR ATTACK: “Water resources or systems can be used as delivery 
vehicles to cause violence to a human population” (Gleick, 2006, 4). 
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CHAPTER 1                                    INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. PERSPECTIVES 
 
This work is intended to be an identification and analysis of the vulnerabilities within water 
infrastructure systems. I do not intend it to be based on a discourse of fear, uncertainty and 
doubt. Instead, its purpose is to create awareness and prompt further mitigation strategies 
that will increase the resilience of this infrastructure.  
 Thus far in the twenty-first century it is adamantly clear that no technology can 
evade risk. Although it may certainly aid in one’s knowledge of the threat spectrum, there 
can be no doubt that significant challenges lay ahead. This is true not only for “natural” 
disasters which appear to be increasing in strength and duration, but also for human-made 
technological disasters as a result of how modern cities, like Toronto, are interconnected 
and interdependent upon an array of assets and platforms. The Internet of Things1 is one 
phrase that seeks to describe this increasing relationship of interconnectivity among 
platforms that have previously never been linked together.  
 When one conceives of the notion of water security, one often thinks of climate 
change, pollution and universal access to clean water. The threat of terrorism is a narrative 
that is not often included as part of this discourse. Professionals in domestic and 
international security are more often likely to explore this subject. 
 On this note, it is of value to indicate that the author is approaching this work with a 
background in emergency management and international security studies. Specifically, the 
author’s previous studies focused on securing the electric grid’s industrial control systems 
from cyber attacks. For the author, work in this field has provided a foundation for how 
                                                
1 The Internet of Things refers to: “The Internet of Things represents an evolution in which objects are 
capable of interacting with other objects” (IBM, 2014). Please refer to glossary of terms for further detail. 
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security is understood through factors such as confidentiality2, integrity3 and availability4. 
Together, these factors are central to critical infrastructure protection and, furthermore, in 
maintaining public confidence. 
As such, the author is writing from the perspective that initiating proactive 
measures in opposition to relying on reactive response is necessary to ensure the safety and 
security of critical infrastructure. This is best illustrated in the five pillars of emergency 
management set out by Emergency Management Ontario. These five pillars consist of 
prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (EMO, 2009). 
 It is the objective of this work to collect information that identifies the 
vulnerabilities within water infrastructure systems, and from here to analyze the current 
level of risk from the perspective of two narratives: a conventional terrorism and critical 
terrorism studies perspective. The former is the one with which the author is most familiar 
and it is based on the assumption that the potential for terrorism emanating from external 
threats, individual or organized, is real and that precautionary measures and planning need 
to be invoked to meet that threat. The latter perspective challenges the author to think about 
terrorism in broader terms and in the context of other threats to water infrastructure, 
including the dangers associated with poor maintenance, lack of funding, and the reluctance 
to develop alternative technologies. 
 In Chapter 2, I identify the importance of protecting water supplies and outlining 
the two perspectives on terrorism studies. In Chapter 3, I describe the dominant water 
infrastructure system and its nature and functions. In Chapter 4, I investigate the potential 
                                                
2 Please refer to the glossary of terms for definition of these terms. 
 
3, 4 Please refer to the glossary of terms for definition of these terms. 
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terrorist threats through the conventional lens of terrorism studies, using academic 
literature, case studies, and interviews of people in the industry. Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
utilize the case study on Walkerton to analyze the critical terrorism studies perspective on 
water security, in addition to briefly discussing sustainable water management and low-
impact development. Chapter 6 will present the author’s assessment, and the appendices 
provide additional information cited throughout this work. 
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CHAPTER 2           THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING        
WATER SUPPLIES FROM TERRORISM: TWO PERSPECTIVES 
 
No living organism is self-sustaining. Although the means of survival has changed 
drastically over the years - especially for humans - nothing changes the fact that humans 
need water to survive. As time has passed, technology has allegedly improved, and so has, 
at least for some, standards of living. For most Canadians, instead of fetching water, it now 
conveniently pours out of the taps in their homes. 
Modern societies are built within and around networks of infrastructures that allow 
it to function. Generally, these infrastructures are often referred to as critical infrastructure, 
and include any necessary societal functions such as power generation, transmission and 
distribution, the continuity of government, communication networks, transportation 
networks, and among various others, water supply, treatment, storage and distribution 
networks. The reality of the twenty-first century is that modern societies are inherently 
dependent, interdependent and interconnected to each of these critical infrastructure 
systems.  
 Every day, Toronto treats more than one billion litres of potable water (City of 
Toronto, 2014). Each day, people are dependent on the City, not only to provide them with 
this invaluable resource, but to also ensure that it is safe to consume. The significance of 
ensuring a municipality’s water infrastructure is safe rests on different levels of 
government.  
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2.1. WATER AS A TOOL VS. TARGET  
History is rampant with “terrorist” attacks on water supplies. There has been no 
shortage of creativity either. From the Assyrians poisoning enemy wells before 500 BCE 
(Frischknecht, 2008, 2), to evidence of Al Qaeda’s “interest in using cyanide, Botulinum 
toxin (Botox), Salmonella typhi (the causative agent of typhoid fever), and Bacillus 
anthracis (the causative agent of Anthrax) to attack US water systems” (Van Leuven, 2011, 
35). There are plenty of examples where water has been utilized as both a tool and a target 
for attack. It is understood that utilizing water as a tool for an attack occurs when water 
supplies are used as delivery vehicles to carry a destructive agent to the targeted human 
population. In comparison to this, utilizing water as a target occurs when the resource itself 
is targeted for destruction or at least jeopardization, and the collateral damage is felt by the 
targeted population (Chalecki, 2001, 52).  
 
YEAR EVENT DISEASE AGENTS AND OUTCOMES 
< 500 BCE ! ASSYRIANS POISONED ENEMY 
WELLS 
! RYE ERGOT FUNGUS CAUSING 
HALLUCINATIONS 
590 BCE ! GREEKS POISON WATER SUPPLY OF 
KIRRHA DURING FIRST SACRED WAR 
! HELLEBORE ROOT CAUSING 
DIARRHEA. KIRRHA FALLS AND THE 
POPULATION IS SLAUGHTERED 
1346 ! TARTARS CATAPULT PLAGUE 
VICTIMS OVER THE WALLS OF CAFFA 
! YERSINIA PESTIS (PLAGUE) 
CAUSING PLAGUE. CITY IS 
ABANDONED 
 
TABLE 1: SELECTION OF POSSIBLE EVENTS OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
SOURCE: MODIFIED FROM (FRISCHKNECHT, 2008, 2). FOR ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES, PLEASE 
REFER TO APPENDIX 1. 
 
Society’s dependence on water resources makes it an ideal and attractive target of 
opportunity. As it currently stands, the Canadian government recognizes the water sector as 
a critical infrastructure and, as a result, it is protected under Public Safety Canada 
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provisions (PSC, 2014). Despite this, the federal government’s participation in the 
safekeeping of the water sector is rather limited. This is because the main responsibility for 
securing the water sector is maintained by the provincial government, and the municipal 
suppliers. In this regard, it is necessary to understand the vulnerabilities of the systems and 
networks at hand, and moreover, determine if there is a credible risk to Canada’s water 
infrastructure. 
 
2.2.  DEFINING  THREATS,   SECURITY   AND   TERRORISM   FROM   A   CONVENTIONAL  TERRORISM  
STUDIES PERSPECTIVE 
 
One dictionary definition of a threat is “an expression of intention to inflict evil, 
injury, or damage” (Merriam-Webster, 2014). It corresponds well with how terrorism is 
understood from a conventional point of view. In particular, a threat may be a reactive or 
proactive approach for the purposes of garnering attention, to intimidate or terrorize an 
audience, or, for the purposes of coercion. Threat is typically associated with security. The 
United States Department of Homeland Security, defines security as “reducing the risk to 
critical infrastructure by physical means or defense cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, or 
the effects of natural or manmade disasters” (DHS, 2014). Examples of security measures 
may include fences, screen locks, antivirus software (DHS, 2014), identification pass cards, 
and closed-circuit television to name a few. Considered together, threats (past, present and 
future) propel the need for security measures to be in place. 
 Conceivably a much more complex term, terrorism is not as easily defined. 
Historically, the meaning of terrorism has changed drastically since its records of the 
Assassins in the eleventh century, to the Regimé de la Terreur in the eighteenth century, 
and even to more recent activities of terrorist-labeled groups such as the Environment 
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Liberation Front (ELF), Al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (PSC, 2014b).  It is important to note here that there is no 
internationally agreed definition of what constitutes terrorism5. Although there are a 
number of reasons for this definitional impasse, the main issue emanates from the decision 
to define terrorism to “exclude armed struggle for liberation and self-determination”6 
(Human Rights Voices, 2014). 
 Even without a legal definition, terrorism has been categorized into different types 
according to its motivation. For example, it is not strange for the media to use terms such as 
environmental terrorism, eco-terrorism, religious terrorism, or political terrorism when 
various agencies report on such events. Although these terms have virtually become 
mainstream, it is important to consider this contentious issue from a number of 
perspectives. 
 According to Bruno Frey, any attempt to define terrorism often results in two types 
of error almost instantaneously: “(1) activities that should reasonably count as terrorist acts 
are excluded and (2) activities that are not terrorist acts are included…one specific 
definition will essentially miss the goal of clarifying the issue, and will instead lead to 
confusion” (Frey, 2004, 9). In addition to this, there are a number of dependents to consider 
in the attempt to define terrorism.  
 As stated by Grant Wardlaw, one of these dependents includes justification (1990). 
Since justification is dependent on the interpretation of morals, Wardlaw argues that 
                                                
5 Where this work does mention terrorism, it defines it as follows: “A synthesis of war and theatre, a 
dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence- that which is deliberately perpetrated on civilian non-
combatant victims –played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes” 
(Combs, 2011, 5).  
6 “This claim purports to exclude blowing up certain civilians from the reach of international law and 
organizations. It is central to interpreting every proclamation by the states which have ratified these 
conventions in any UN forum purporting to combat terrorism” (Human Rights Voices, 2014). 
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terrorism can be regarded as a moral problem where some cases of violence are justifiable 
and others are not (Wardlaw, 1990, 4). For example: 
 The Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO] is seen by some nations as a terrorist 
group having no political legitimacy and using morally unjustifiable methods of 
violence to achieve unacceptable ends. On the other hand, other nations view the PLO 
as the legitimate representatives of an oppressed people using necessary and justifiable 
violence [not terrorism] to achieve just and inevitable ends. The definition rests, then, 
on moral justification (Wardlaw, 1990, 4-5). 
 
This example further insinuates the notion that one person’s terrorist is another person’s 
freedom fighter. Essentially, moral justification is contained within the individual – in their 
beliefs and experiences. Similar to this, the justification of terrorism is also rooted in the 
social meaning that is assigned to the word terrorism (Wardlaw, 1990, 5), thereby asserting 
that one individual’s definition of terrorism may not be in line with another individual’s 
analysis, just as one’s interpretation of justice may differ from other interpretations. 
 Taking this into account, this work takes the position that terrorism has a social 
meaning in society. Within this social meaning, there is a social construction of reality 
where “moral meanings ascribed to people or events are situationally dependent” 
(Wardlaw, 1990, 5). In this sense, terrorism is rather subjective. But, assuming we did have 
a clear definition of what terrorism is, can it ever be justified? (Miesels, 2008, 30). Without 
grounds for justification, one cannot positively separate terrorism from legitimate action 
against oppression, marginalization or neglect. Without knowing the difference, it will 
continue to elude comprehension. 
 Notwithstanding the above discussion, the conventional perspective on terrorism 
argues that there is something called terrorism that constitutes a threat and risk to the public 
good and that states and societies need to consider and plan for it. 
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2.3. TERRORISM FROM A CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES PERSPECTIVE 
 Further to the above perspective, Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) has emerged as a 
study that approaches terrorism from an alternative, broad perspective addressing the role 
of states and government agencies in using violence against their own citizens, or citizens 
of foreign countries (Lutz, 2010, 31). The advantage of this perspective is that it attempts to 
identify acts of political violence that are “terroristic” in nature without imposing pre-
determined conceptual limits on which acts may qualify as terrorism perpetrated by state or 
non-state actors occurring during peace or war (Jackson, 2009, 14). 
 Essentially, CTS seeks to challenge the ‘bias’ that exists within conventional 
terrorism studies. According to Richard Jackson, these biases include: 
• The propensity to focus on states and groups that Western states oppose;  
• The failure to contemplate actions practiced by allies of Western states as having a 
terroristic nature;  
• That terrorism is a major threat to international security; and  
• That terrorists are mentally unstable (Jackson, 2008). 
 
By challenging the above, CTS maintains a larger interdisciplinary framework than 
conventional terrorism studies. Perhaps one of the main differences between the two fields 
of study is the concept of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ – a concept which CTS is portrayed as 
dispelling, and which conventional terrorism studies appears to provoke. As we move 
forward in this work, this concept will become increasingly relevant in determining how 
one gauges responsibility in the outcome of events. 
 Given the modern day threat spectrum, it would be a very delicate matter to tread 
upon if one were to choose either side as being the sole answer to research on terrorism. 
There are far too many variables and intelligence gaps (unknown alliances, insider threats, 
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sabotage, espionage, etc) that exist for the author of this work to fully subscribe to one 
single point of view. 
 It cannot go without recognition that states play a significant role in both increasing 
and reducing its vulnerability to terrorism. Similar to how methods of prevention are 
brought about through policy and legislation, so to are vulnerabilities. As such, the author 
believes that terrorism is a rather complex area of study that should not be limited to one 
particular point of view. However, there is a scale for everything, which is why this work 
mostly agrees with the positions of CTS, but still acknowledges certain views that originate 
from conventional terrorism studies. In particular, the author appreciates how critical 
terrorism studies endeavors to reveal that the gap between 
Those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize 
the acts of terrorists and those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those 
who glorify it – is not as great as it is implied or asserted by orthodox terrorism 
experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press (Booth, 2008, 66). 
 
However, in a number of instances, this gap may also be much more complex than it 
appears, which is why it is still essential to keep in mind the positions held by 
conventional terrorism researchers. Further to this, because terrorism itself is a rather 
subjective topic, it is difficult to limit oneself to a single point of view.  
 In particular, the perspective of critical terrorism studies will be valuable when 
discussing the Walkerton case study in Chapter 5 of this work. Not only will it provide an 
alternate approach to what occurred there, but it will also serve to open up the discussion to 
issues that may not be traditionally viewed as a threat: privatization and neoliberalization. 
“Under neoliberalism everything either is for sale or is plundered for profit” (Giroux, 2005, 
2). This notion is the foundation for the critical terrorism studies perspective on closing the 
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gap between what is, and what is often not understood to be an act of terrorism. As such, 
Walkerton is a unique case study since it represents a pivotal point where the benefits of 
neoliberalization were called into question. Not only does it showcase the failure of water 
infrastructure to detect a harmful substance, but it also calls into questions the benefits and 
harm of both centralized and decentralized control of public goods.   
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CHAPTER 3                       WATER INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS 
 
 Generally speaking, the current dominant water infrastructure systems are 
comprised of the supply/source (raw water), raw water transmission pipes, the treatment 
systems, the distribution systems (Ahmadi, 2010, 4414), and finally, the operational control 
systems that make it all possible (i.e. SCADA). Of course, once the water is used, it enters 
the wastewater infrastructure system, which is essentially comprised of collection and 
treatment facilities, and again operational control systems. Figure 1 below illustrates this 
cycle. 
 
FIGURE 1: TYPICAL WATER DISTRIBUTION AND WASTEWATER COLLECTION SYSTEM 
SCHEMATIC 
SOURCE: (BIRKETT, 2011, 458). 
 
As depicted above, there are many parts and points to the entire water infrastructure 
system. With respect to this, the potential vulnerable areas have been identified as follows:  
“(1) Water sources, (i.e. river, reservoir, and wells);  
(2) Water treatment plants that remove impurities and harmful agents and make 
water suitable for domestic consumption and other uses;  
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(3) Water distribution pipelines that deliver clean water on demand to homes, 
commercial establishments, and industries;  
(4) Storages (tanks); and  
(5) Other facilities” (Hasestad, et al, 2003, np). 
 
FIGURE 2: ELEMENTS AND VULNERABLE POINTS IN A GENERAL WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 
SOURCE: (HASESTAD, ET AL 2003, NP). 
 
As Figure 1 and 2 both illustrate, the water infrastructure is comprised of both 
natural and technological elements to serve its customers. The following sections within 
this chapter will go into further detail about the most critical portions of this infrastructure.  
3.1 (RAW) SOURCE WATER  
 Sources where water is derived from are very diverse and differ for every 
municipality. Often, they include lakes, deep wells, rivers, and, in some cases, recycled 
sewage water. Depending on the availability of source water, some municipalities may 
depend on a combination of sources (Kroll, 2013, 5) to serve their population. Toronto’s 
water supply is obtained from Lake Ontario. 
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 Evidently, water sources usually cannot be attacked physically, per se7. However, 
depending on the size of the area the source water is obtained from, it may be vulnerable to 
contamination. Simply put, you cannot guard every single point of a lake or a river; it 
would neither be possible, or cost effective. While larger water sources have a built-in 
safeguard against intentional contamination (employees in the water industry refer to this as 
“the solution to pollution is dilution”), (Kroll, 2013, 5) smaller sources are much more 
vulnerable. Nevertheless, water sources can also be said to have a safeguard alongside 
dilution: sunlight. This is because potential contaminants must be suitable for dissemination 
in water: they must be “viable, dissolvable, stable, and transportable” (Gleick, 2007, 16). 
Although overcoming this obstacle is difficult, it is not impossible8.  
3.2 TREATMENT PLANTS 
 As indicated above, Toronto obtains water from the Lake Ontario. From here, pipes 
transport it to one of four treatment facilities: R.C. Harris Water Treatment Plant, F.J. 
Horgan Water Treatment Plant, R.L. Clark Water Treatment Plant, or the Island Water 
treatment Plant9 (City of Toronto, 2014).  
Water treatment plants are unique in the sense that for the most part, they represent 
the final barrier between contamination (accidental, deliberate or natural) and the customer 
(Kroll, 2013, 6). Therefore, the treatment plant is said to be the final stage where 
monitoring for any potential contamination occurs. As a result of this, treatment plants 
present an opportunity to impose a varying degree of harm. With keen knowledge of this, 
Al Qaeda (and perhaps others) have displayed interest in the DCS and SCADA devices 
                                                
7 Unlike untreated water storage tanks. However, according to Kroll, contaminating untreated water storage 
tanks is unlikely, but nuisance attacks may be more likely (Kroll, 2013, 6). 
8 For example: (1) Lake Superior: Mercury Poisoning (Copeland, et al, 2012, 1); and (2) Grassy Narrows 
1969 (Rivers in Sarnia, Ontario) (Harada, et al, 2011, 1). 
9 For statistics on the four treatment plants, please see Appendix 2. 
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(which are utilized as operational control systems) for the purpose of disabling or 
disrupting the monitoring and control capability these system offer (Hildick-Smith, 2005, 
7). 
 With regards to the above, perhaps an important feature to keep in mind during the 
treatment process, is that various chemicals are intentionally added to the water10 (Kroll, 
2013, 6). Considering this factor along with the knowledge that terrorist groups such as Al 
Qaeda have expressed interest in recruiting skilled individuals for the purpose of attacking 
water infrastructure systems (Poulsen, 2002), one may consider the outcome of deliberately 
releasing a large amount of potentially toxic content into the entire system! To think of this 
from an alternate perspective, Kroll explains that the potential adversary may not even have 
to infiltrate the treatment facility itself. He argues that it may be much simpler to infiltrate 
one of the companies responsible for delivering chemicals to the treatment plant,11 or, to 
simply increase the dosage of usually benign chemicals up to toxic levels (Kroll, 2013, 6). 
Attending to such an issue as this may be problematic especially considering that such an 
incident may be realized by an external or internal source. Chapter 4B.3 will discuss this 
further in the section regarding cyber threats.  
3.3 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
In brief, the distribution system within the water infrastructure system is comprised 
of an entire network of pipes, valves, pumping stations, reservoirs, and elevated tanks, to 
name a few (City of Toronto, 2014). Toronto’s water distribution network is basically made 
up of four treatment plants, eighteen pumping stations, ten reservoirs and four elevated 
                                                
10 This may include flocculating agents, caustics, acids, and disinfectants, among others (Kroll, 2013, 6).  
11 The fear here being that one may be able to contaminate or replace the usual shipment with a toxic 
compound and deliver it to the plant as normal for the plant operators to add to the treatment cycle. Instead of 
‘cleaning’ the water, they would be poisoning the finished water (Kroll, 2013, 6).  
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tanks that are each monitored by the Transmission Control Centre via a computerized 
process control system12 (City of Toronto, 2014).  
Widely acknowledged as the most vulnerable element in the water infrastructure 
network, the distribution system poses the greatest concern to public safety. Not only is this 
because monitoring for contaminants hardly exists, but the potential for dilution is greatly 
reduced, along with the time available to respond (Kroll, 2013, 7).  
 According to Kroll, the most likely scenario for an attack on the distribution system 
(if the goal is to inflict mass casualties), is to mobilize a backflow contamination incident 
utilizing a pump:  
A backflow attack occurs when a pump is used to overcome the pressure gradient that 
is present in the distribution system’s pipes.  This can be easily achieved by using 
pumps available for rent or purchase at most home improvement stores.  After the 
pressure gradient present in the system has been overcome and a contaminant 
introduced, siphoning effects act to pull the contaminant into the flowing system.  
Once the contaminant is present in the pipes, the normal movement of water in the 
system acts to disseminate the contaminant throughout the network affecting areas 
surrounding the introduction point.  The introduction point can be anywhere in the 
system such as a fire hydrant, commercial building, or residence.  Some areas, 
however, are more vulnerable than others.  Access points near high flow areas and 
larger pipes would be favored because they would disseminate the material to a wider 
area more quickly; however, any point except for those at the very end of long 
deadhead lines could be used to effectively access the system (Kroll, 2013, 7).  
 
                                                
12 “The computer system, overseen by a Pumping Control Officer, provides information on water pressures, 
flows, storage reservoir levels and chlorine residuals, as well as water and power consumption. In addition, 
equipment performance, flood conditions, temperatures in buildings and unauthorized entry are monitored. 
The Pumping Control Officer can control the operation of each pumping station and system valve operations 
to keep a proper balance between supply and demand while maintaining sufficient water pressure throughout” 
(City of Toronto, 2014).  
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FIGURE 3: IMAGE DEPICTING THE VULNERABILITY OF DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS TO 
BACKFLOW ATTACKS. 
SOURCE: (KROLL, 2013, 8). 
 
In recognition of the above vulnerabilities, the most likely compounds of concern, 
according to Kroll, are: heavy metals, herbicides, insecticides, nematocides & rodenticides, 
industrial chemicals & miscellaneous agents, illegal drugs, radionuclides, commercial 
products, chemical warfare agents, toxins and biogents (Kroll, 2013, 8). Further details of 
these agents are provided in Appendix 3.  
On account of monitoring within the distribution system, two types of detection 
systems are used: toxicity monitoring and multi-parameter monitoring. Although each of 
these presents great benefits, there is also a problem in their use. In regards to toxicity 
monitoring, the tests used are proficient in identifying chemical toxins, but are largely 
ineffective in detecting biological agents (i.e. bacteria and viruses) (Kroll, 2013, 11). On the 
other hand, multi-parameter monitoring can detect a much larger assortment of potential 
threat agents from metals to organics to bio-agents (Kroll, 2013, 13). However, every 
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instrument has its disadvantages. In particular, these instruments are costly and require a 
large site for deployment, and many of these instruments generate a waste stream that 
would need to be managed (Kroll, 2013, 14).  
3.4  WASTEWATER SYSTEM 
Although Toronto’s water treatment enterprise began in 184313, it was not until 
1910 that construction began for Toronto’s first wastewater treatment system at the 
southern tip of Leslie Street (Toronto, 2014). Then referred to as the Main Treatment Plant, 
it treated a capacity of 150,000 cubic metres of wastewater per day (Toronto, 2014). Today, 
we refer to this plant as the Ashbridges Bay Wastewater Treatment Plant, and there are 
three others that provide the same service: North Toronto Wastewater Treatment Plant, 
Highland Creek Wastewater Treatment Plant and the Humber Wastewater Treatment Plant 
– each of which are owned and operated by the City of Toronto (Toronto, 2014).  
Without question, wastewater constitutes a significant threat to public health. It 
includes the mixture of both solid and liquid waste from residents and businesses that travel 
through a city’s sanitary sewer system until it arrives at the wastewater treatment plant 
(Toronto, 2014). However, similar to the water supply system, wastewater treatment 
involves comparable provisions: collection, treatment, discharge systems and the control 
systems within these stages. This is further broken down in Figure 4 on the following page. 
 
                                                
13 The Toronto Gas, Light and Water Company (private corporation), began to distribute water through a 
small scale distribution system made out of wooden pipes to citizens who could afford the cost of the 
service…It was not until 1872 that City Council obtained passage of an act to form a publicly administered 
water works service (Toronto, 2014). 
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FIGURE 4: OVERVIEW OF WASTEWATER TREATMENT SYSTEM 
SOURCE: (TORONTO, 2010). 
 
 If not anything else, the image above illustrates the potential hazards involved in 
transporting wastewater. In this case, providing physical and cyber security will be critical 
to coping with potential threats. This topic will be further discussed in the case studies 
section of this work. 
3.5  SYSTEM OVERVIEW  
 As the sections in this chapter have indicated, the dominant water infrastructure 
system contains strengths and weaknesses. Thus far, this work has identified the systems 
involved in the treatment of water and wastewater systems. In the following, this work will 
explore how these threats may be realized. 
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CHAPTER 4                    CONVENTIONAL TERRORISM STUDIES  
 PERSPECTIVES ON WATER SECURITY ISSUES 
 
 In the post 9/11 world, conventional terrorism studies have become increasingly 
popular. Terrorists are seen as lurking everywhere and it appears that everything, to some 
extent has been securitized. Environmental security, food security, energy security and 
human security are a few of the many examples available. However, to some degree, each 
one of these relates back to the notion of water security. Although this term may be used to 
describe drought and water pollution, these aspects of water security fall out of the scope in 
conventional terrorism studies. Conventional terrorism studies typically focus what legal 
scholars refer to as the actus reus and mens rea: the act and the intent to exploit water 
infrastructure systems and networks for malicious14 purposes. 
PART A: SOURCES AND HAZARDS 
4A.1 THREAT SOURCES AND HAZARDS 
 Terrorist threats to water systems are typically grouped into three sources: (1) 
External; (2) Internal; and (3) Miscellaneous (Van Leuven, 2011, 34). These sources are 
further broken down in Figure 5 below.  
 
FIGURE 5: POSSIBLE THREAT SOURCES 
SOURCE: (VAN LEUVEN, 2011, 34).  
 
                                                
14 For example, with the intention to cause harm (Merriam-Webster, 2014).  
EXTERNAL 
•  TERRORISTS 
•  SABOTEURS 
INTERNAL 
•  DISGRUNTLED EMPLOYEES 
•  SECURITY BREACHES 
MISC 
•  ACCIDENTS (UNCONTROLLED ACCESS) 
•  FRUSTRATED ACTIVISTS 
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Considering the threat sources on the previous page, the hazards and threats to a 
water supply system may be broken down as follows: 
 
HUMAN RELATED THREATS 
 
! PHYSICAL DISRUPTION OF SCADA (SUPERVISORY 
CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION) NETWORK 
! ATTACKS ON CENTRAL CONTROL SYSTEM TO CREATE 
SIMULTANEOUS FAILURES  
CYBER THREATS 
 
! ELECTRONIC ATTACKS USING WORMS AND VIRUSES 
! NETWORK FLOODING 
! JAMMING 
! DISGUISING DATA TO NEUTRALIZE CHLORINE OR ADD 
NO DISINFECTANT, ALLOWING ADDITION OF MICROBES 
 
PHYSICAL THREATS 
 
! PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION OF SYSTEM’S ASSETS OR 
DISRUPTION OF WATER SUPPLY IS MORE LIKELY THAN 
CONTAMINATION 
! LOSS OF WATER PRESSURE COMPROMISING 
FIREFIGHTING CAPABILITIES AND COULD LEAD TO 
POSSIBLE BACTERIAL BUILD-UP IN THE SYSTEM 
! POTENTIAL FOR CREATING A WATER HAMMER EFFECT 
BY OPENING AND CLOSING MAJOR CONTROL VALVES AND 
TURNING PUMPS ON AND OFF TOO QUICKLY, WHICH 
COULD RESULT IN SIMULTANEOUS MAIN BREAKS.  
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL 
THREATS 
 
! HEATH PROBLEMS, OR DEATH OF CUSTOMERS 
! PANIC 
! LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE  
 
 
TABLE 2: HAZARDS AND THREATS TO A WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 
SOURCE: MODIFIED FROM (AHMADI, ET AL, 2010, 4416). 
  
4A.2 WHY ATTACK THE WATER INFRASTRUCTURE? 
Exemplified in Table 2, an intentional attack on water infrastructure systems has the 
potential to yield dire results. Although recognition of the potential devastation has been 
acknowledged, questions such as ‘the system has never been attacked before, why would it 
be attacked now?’ not only cast doubt on the likelihood of an attack, but creates a 
problematic perspective blind to the reality that risks to water systems are increasing as a 
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result of an evolving threat environment (Van Leuven, 2011, 29), and the inability to adapt 
to change15. 
The potential to attack the water sector is certainly not new. In 1941, the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover stated, “It has long been recognized 
that among public utilities, water supply facilities offer a particularly vulnerable point of 
attack to the foreign agent, due to the strategic position they occupy in keeping the wheels 
of industry turning and in preserving the health and morale of the American populace” 
(Hoover, 1941, 1861-1865). What Hoover is discussing is the notion of interdependency, 
and most especially today, interconnectivity. 
 Increasingly, water infrastructure systems have become controlled and automated 
from remote locations in the name of efficiency. Additionally, this infrastructure relies on 
services provided by other critical infrastructures. This creates a ‘system of systems’ where 
a failure in one infrastructure has the capability of cascading, resulting in a disruption or 
failure to other critical infrastructures, and ultimately having consequences that could affect 
public health and safety, the economy, the government, national security, and finally, 
public confidence (Bahadur and William, 2011, 67). To illustrate this further, Figure 6 on 
the next page maps the interdependencies of the water sector. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 This is especially true in regards to how IT specialists and Industrial Control System (ICS) operators 
conflict on their views of security. Please refer to Appendix 7 for further information 
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FIGURE 6: INTERDEPENDENCIES WITH THE WATER SECTOR 
SOURCE: (DHS, 2007). 
 
As depicted above, it is evident that the water infrastructure has a number of nodes to it. 
Some of these nodes may be of interest for an indirect, or direct attack opportunity. Some 
of these vulnerabilities will be discussed in the upcoming chapters. 
4A.3 CONTAMINANTS OF CONCERN 
 Amongst a number of security issues pertaining to water is contamination, which 
may be realized through a physical or cyber attack. Although chemical and biological 
agents may evidently be less effective16 as water threats, such agents are potentially capable 
of causing casualties (Bahadur and William, 2011, 70). According to Deininger, a 
contaminant must meet the following criteria in order for it to be an effective threat: 
 
                                                
16 This is highly dependent on the type of toxin or pathogen used, and moreover, the quantity and quality 
used. 
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• “High toxicity–deadly effect in small amounts  
• No taste or odor 
• Chemical and physical stability 
• Delayed action to protect the sabotage agent 
• Difficult recognition of poisoning – no specific pathologic changes in the organism 
• Difficulties with the detection of the poison with normal analytical methods  
• Unusual effects of poison; no known antidotes” (Deininger, 2000, np).  
 
In addition to the above, knowledge of the infrastructure system – either physically or via a 
cyber means – is also necessary as this will be the final barrier to achieving the end state of 
a potential attack. Surely, knowledge of the vulnerabilities of the water infrastructure 
system as a whole will be critical to success at this point. So, the next question is: what is 
the water infrastructure system comprised of, and, do any vulnerabilities exist? 
4A.4 SUMMARY OF THOUGHTS 
 This chapter, using a conventional terrorism studies lens has illustrated a number of 
security issues pertaining to water infrastructure systems. As alluded to earlier, there are a 
number of threat sources and hazards that have been identified as the potential means of an 
attack. But, this still begs the question, why would anyone want to attack water 
infrastructure systems? Further to this, who would carry out such a heinous action? Should 
all attacks upon infrastructure be observed through the lens of terrorism? What action or 
‘use of force’ would constitute an attack? Moreover, how does one define attack? Does an 
attack always consist of a direct action, or can indirect action contribute to its definition? 
 Answering these questions can be an entire book on its own. Although it is not the 
objective of this work to answer each of the above questions, they constantly remain on the 
conscience of the author. Earlier on, it was brought forward that terrorism is a subjective 
topic, and it is difficult to limit oneself to viewing it through the conventional or critical 
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studies lens. Essentially, both are required to provide a holistic comprehension on the 
issues of defining and understanding terrorism, and furthermore, defeating it. Both 
conventional and critical terrorism studies will require one to consider the “roots” of 
terrorism. While the conventional study will often assess the “terrorists” personality, 
critical terrorism studies will take a step back and ask the bigger questions: who is this 
individual?; why did this individual commit this action?; what provoked him/her?; and so 
on. In sum, critical terrorism studies is interdisciplinary in that it seeks to analyze the roots 
more so than conventional terrorism studies. This is crucial since understanding the roots of 
terrorism will essentially allow one to understand why acts of terrorism occur, and 
moreover, present an opportunity for terrorist attacks to diminish in frequency and severity. 
 Perhaps of increasing concern are the ongoing threats put forward by ISIS since mid 
autumn 2014. Although the attacks thus far have been carried out by ISIS sympathizers, 
and have been relatively simplistic in terms of weaponry, the positive identification of an 
ISIS laptop (in August 2014) describing how to develop biological weapons - among other 
things – indicates the interest in carrying out complex attacks. At the very least, the nature 
of this circumstance should prompt a review of current infrastructure security issues, and 
furthermore, an attempt to resolve them. 
Alas, we can return to the question posed earlier: What is the water infrastructure 
comprised of, and, do any vulnerabilities exist? 
PART B:  THE THREAT 
 
Before we begin this part of the chapter, a schematic of the threats to the entire 
water infrastructure system is provided on the following page with a view to map out the 
overall threats to the water supply system as a whole. 
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FIGURE 7: HAZARD AND THREATS TO A WATER SUPPLY SYSTEM 
SOURCE: (AHMADI, 2010, 4417). 
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4B.1  BIOLOGICAL THREATS 
 As alluded to in previous sections, biological threats to water infrastructure are 
highly dependent on the concentration of the toxin or pathogen in the water17. It is for this 
reason that source water is not as much of an ideal threat as treatment plants, storage 
facilities and especially the distribution system. First and foremost, the addresses for each 
of these locations are readily available on the City of Toronto’s website (City of Toronto, 
2014). So, how can a biological threat be realized? 
 Before we divulge into this question, it is necessary to understand that biological 
agents fall into two separate categories: toxins and pathogens18. Table 3 and 4 below will 
identify the biological toxins and pathogens that are considered water threats: 
PATHOGEN TYPE WEAPONIZED STABLE IN 
WATER 
CHLORINE 
TOLERANCE 
ANTHRAX B YES 2 YEARS SPORES SPORES 
RESISTANT 
BRUCELLOSIS B YES 20-72 DAYS UNKNOWN 
CLOSTRIDIUM 
PERFRINGENS 
B PROBABLE COMMON IN 
SEWAGE 
RESISTANT 
TULAREMIA B YES <90 DAYS INACTIVATED,  
1 PPM, 5 MIN 
SHIGELLOSIS B UNKNOWN 2-3 DAYS INACTIVATED, 
0.05 PPM,  
10 MIN 
CHOLERA B UNKNOWN YES “EASILY 
KILLED” 
PLAGUE B PROBABLE 16 DAYS UNKNOWN 
Q FEVER R YES UNKNOWN UNKNOWN 
HEPATITIS A V UNKNOWN UNKNOWN INACTIVATED, 
0.4 PPM, 30 MIN 
NOTES: B, BACTERIA; R, RICKETTSIA; V, VIRUS 
TABLE 3: BIOLOGICAL PATHOGENS CONSIDERED WATER THREATS 
SOURCE: MODIFIED FROM (GLEICK, 2007, 20). 
                                                
17 Biological threats do not pose a serious risk to wastewater utilities as treated sewage is not consumed in Canada 
(Sauder, 2010, 13) 
18 Toxins are “chemicals derived from the natural metabolic processes of organisms”, while pathogens are live organisms 
“such as bacteria, viruses or protozoa” (Hickman 1999).  
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TOXIN WEAPONIZED STABLE IN WATER CHLORINE 
TOLERANCE 
BOTULINUM YES YES INACTIVATED AT 6 
PPM, 20 MIN 
T-2 MYCOTOXIN PROBABLE YES RESISTANT 
AFLATOXIN YES PROBABLE RESISTANT 
RICIN YES UNKNOWN RESISTANT AT 10 
PPM 
STAPHYLOCOCCUS 
ENTEROTOXINS 
PROBABLE PROBABLE UNKNOWN 
MICROCYSTINS POSSIBLE PROBABLE VERY RESISTANT AT 
100 PPM 
ANATOXIN A UNKNOWN INACTIVATED IN 
DAYS 
UNKNOWN 
TETRODOTOXIN POSSIBLE UNKNOWN INACTIVATED, 50 
PPM 
SAXITOXIN POSSIBLE YES RESISTANT AT 10 
PPM 
 
TABLE 4: BIOLOGICAL TOXINS CONSIDERED WATER THREATS 
SOURCE: MODIFIED FROM (GLEICK, 2007, 21). 
 
 As depicted above, there are a number of toxins and pathogens that remain resistant 
to chlorine treatment. Given this, it is evident that bioagents may pose a notable threat to 
water infrastructure systems 19. Although most research on ‘bioterrorism’ and water 
infrastructure systems cite major barriers and drawbacks to those who may attempt to 
poison the system20, much of these studies fail to account for the fact that little to no 
monitoring is done at the distribution stage, and where monitoring does occur, how quickly 
a response occurs before the affects are felt by the population.  
 A successful attack utilizing bioagents may occur as a result of a physical attack (ie. 
A backflow attack), or a cyber attack, which will be discussed later in this chapter. For 
                                                
19 However, it is also key to mention that information is not readily available on how these pathogens and 
toxins are affected by the newer, non-chlorine based water treatment systems, such as ultraviolet disinfection, 
ozonation, and advanced filtration (Gleick, 2007, 21) 
20 For example, dilution, chlorine 
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example, Hickman cites that only 0.21 kilograms of Botulinum Toxin is necessary to 
effectively contaminate a 750,000 litre storage facility, and ingestion of only 250 millilitres 
would result in a disabling dose (Hickman, 1999, 1). Although the greatest task of using a 
biological agent on any part of the water supply systems is the ability to procure the agent 
(Sauder, 2010, 11), it is quite evident that significant damage can be done. 
 As discussed in previous sections, there is no reliable detection system for 
biological agents (Simon, 1997, 428-430). Even the multi-parameter monitoring has its 
setbacks in that it would likely not get the information out to the public in time to prevent 
casualties. This illustrates the reality that the only true monitoring that occurs after water 
leaves the treatment facilities is public health monitoring: if the population gets sick, there 
is likely a problem (Sauder, 2010, 11). 
 But just how real is this threat? Can it be realized? Ken Alibek21, a former Soviet 
Biopreparat22 Scientist has indicated that with the fall of the Soviet Union, a large number 
of scientists are unaccounted for. Dr. Alibek states the following: 
The services of an ex-Biopreparat scientist would be a bargain at any price. The 
information he could provide would save months, perhaps years, of costly scientific 
research for any nation interested in developing, or improving a biological warfare 
program. It is impossible to know how many Russians have been recruited abroad, 
but there is no doubt that their expertise has been attracting bidders. At least twenty-
five former specialists in the Soviet Union’s biological warfare program are now in 
the United States. Many more have gone to Europe and Asia or have simply dropped 
out of sight. I’ve heard that several went to Iraq and North Korea. A former 
colleague, now the director of a Biopreparat institute, told me that five of our 
scientists are in Iran. The New York Times reported in December 1998 that the Iranian 
government dispatched a ‘scientific advisor’ attached to the office of the presidency 
to Moscow to recruit former scientists from our program…Last year, Top Secret 
reported that a Biopreparat official turned up at the Chinese embassy in Moscow to 
offer his services…The West is also worried…the vulnerability of our biological 
arsenal should also raise concern. A vial of freeze-dried powder takes up less space 
                                                
21 Dr. Ken Alibek defected from the Soviet Union, and now resides in the United States. 
22 Biopreparat Labs were amongst one of the closest guarded secrets of the Cold War. It can likely be 
compared to Camp Detrick in Maryland, USA. 
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than a pack of cigarettes and is easy to smuggle past an inattentive guard. It happened 
when I was at Biopreparat, when security was at its peak. Biological agents once kept 
secure in government facilities are rumored to be circulating freely in the Russian 
criminal underworld (Alibek, 1999,271-272). 
 
Clearly, Dr. Alibek’s statement is quite profound in that it illustrates expertise and 
evidently, uncertainty. Whether an attack is currently being planned is unknown, but 
statements such as his certainly force one to consider the possibilities. 
4B.2  CHEMICAL THREATS 
 Similar to biological threats, chemical threats may also be classified into two types 
of agents: chemical weapons and industrial chemicals. Similar to biological agents, 
chemical agents may be difficult to produce – although this has changed with the advent of 
the Internet as a global information hub. Table 5 on the following page provides a rundown 
of the dose and solubility of chemical agents. Particular attention should be drawn to the 
point that a lethal chemical dose is vastly reduced compared to biological agents.  
 Very low doses of chemical agents have the potential to produce abrupt death 
(Hickman, 1999, 1)23. Industrial chemicals are the most likely agents to be used as they are 
widely available at innumerable sites across Canada (Sauder, 2010, 12). Perhaps the best 
example is Sodium Cyanide (used largely in the mining and metals industry). According to 
Hickman, “death or incapacitation can result from a 25mg oral dose” (Hickman, 1999, 1). 
A simple Internet search for ‘sodium cyanide’24 (NaCN) easily turns up suppliers for this 
product. It is an odorless white salt that is highly soluble and stable in water (approximately 
                                                
23 The Sarin attack in Japan’s subway by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995 and the U.S. Anthrax attack in 2001 
exemplify this. 
24 For example: http://www.alibaba.com/showroom/sodium-
cyanide.html?uptime=20121129&ptsid=1013000015669012&crea=28367223020&plac=&netw=g&device=c
&ptscode=0110202060010001 
 
  G. CIOFFI     31 
 
 
80 percent at 35 Degrees Celsius) (Hickman, 1999, 1). Hickman cites the following 
scenario: 
Thus, a saboteur with four and a quarter 100-pound “cement” bags of NaCN, with 
access to the clear wells, or storage bladders in the austere case, could generate a 
poisonous slug of water that could kill or incapacitate every consumer downstream. 
 Properly timed, a “construction worker” could cripple operations through a relatively 
cheap and simple asymmetric attack (Hickman, 1999, 1).  
 
 
TABLE 5: VIABLE CHEMICAL AGENT OPTIONS (DOSE AND WATER SOLUBILITY) 
SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM (SAUDER, 2010, 12). 
 
 To add to Hickman’s scenario, it is important to note that there is limited 
monitoring obtainable for chemical threats because such tests are designed to monitor for 
specific compounds (Sauder, 2010, 13). Hickman further echoes this by citing that  
“chemicals do not have compounds that can be inactivated through current purification 
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methods” (Hickman, 1999, 1)25.  Moreover, it can be stated that the vulnerabilities 
mentioned herein (within the treatment, storage and distribution network) can be quite 
easily exploitable with chemical agents, especially given the lack of effective monitoring. 
4B.3  CYBER THREATS 
Cyber threats pose a great risk to water infrastructure systems. This work has 
previously mentioned industrial/operational control systems such as SCADA (Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition) and DCS (Distributed Control Systems). Essentially, what 
these systems have accomplished is centralized control, which has had economic benefits 
for utilities. However, to the dismay of all computer users, even these systems have their 
shortfalls, and therefore produce additional vulnerabilities that increase the risk to water 
infrastructure.  
Essentially, SCADA systems are comprised of three main components: field 
devices26, servers27, and client machines28 (Sauder, 2010, 13). Although the SCADA 
system is utilized on its own Intranet, this only limits29 the vulnerability of cyber 
exploitation. It does not render it completely secure. The best example of this is the Stuxnet 
worm which was designed to directly attack a particular Siemens SCADA system that 
happened to be in large-scale use in Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities. Although there is 
much evidence that this worm was State-sponsored, its code has since been copied and is 
available online (Kaplan, 2011, 1). Additionally, other websites have released their own 
                                                
25 Likewise to biological agents, chemical agents do not pose a threat to the wastewater infrastructure as 
treated sewage is not consumed in Canada (Sauder, 2010, 13) 
26 “Field devices provide information and operational control to pumps, pressure, valves and other operations 
around the utility” (Sauder, 2010, 13) 
27 “Servers combine the information from the field devices and monitor it remotely to ensure all systems are 
running correctly, alarms are triggered if functions are not operating normally” (Sauder, 2010, 13) 
28 “Client machines are used for monitoring and user control of the entire system” (Sauder, 2010, 13) 
29 The term limit is used herein as it has been publically revealed that hacking into an isolated system using 
FM radio signals is possible. See “AirHopper” hack (Kumar, 2014). 
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versions of malicious codes that target SCADA and other system exploits. For example, the 
GLEG30 exploitation kit offers 128 exploits as of version 1.17 (Chaney, 2012). Metasploit 
is also another website which offers similar exploitation kits (Chaney, 2012).  
 In addition to the above, many more vulnerabilities have materialized as a result of 
a multiplicity of means and improper actions. Consequently, threats and vulnerabilities will 
continue to emerge until more sophisticated security strategies are implemented. Appendix 
4 further exemplifies SCADA Vulnerabilities. 
 As a result of the nature of such control/operational systems, effectively gaining 
control of the SCADA system would grant the saboteur operational access to the system. 
Essentially, the saboteur can effectively access, bypass, modify, or shutdown any number 
of programs or systems within the water infrastructure system (i.e. chemical or biological 
agents could be dispensed directly into the system (Shea & Library of Congress, 2004 ; 
Sauder, 2010, 13-14). Unlike biological or chemical agents, a cyber threat can also have 
implications to wastewater treatment facilities (i.e. Maroochy Wastewater Treatment Plant, 
Australia). 
 As we move forward into the twenty-first century, utilities are relying more heavily 
on systems that provide centralized control and data acquisition such as SCADA (Sauder, 
2010, 13-14). Despite this, and the current ‘off-the-shelf’ exploit kits available, “there 
appears to be little market incentive to directly increase industrial control system security” 
(Shea & Library of Congress, 2004 ; Sauder, 2010, 14). Given the critical operational role 
SCADA systems maintain in the water and wastewater treatment process, it can be 
                                                
30 See http://www.gleg.net/ for further information  
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surmised that these systems present a huge vulnerability to the water infrastructure system 
as a whole31.  
4B.4  PHYSICAL THREATS 
 Physical threats to the water infrastructure system may employ the use of 
explosives, property damage, arson, and mechanical tampering (Van Leuven, 2011, 45) to 
name a few. Additionally, it has the likelihood of occurring from three threat sources: 
external (sabotage), external (criminal), and internal (disgruntled employee) (Van Leuven, 
2011, 45). Table 6 below goes into further detail using the pump station as an example of 
an asset that would be physically attacked.  
ASSET THREAT TACTICS LIKELIHOOD OF 
SUCCESS 
PUMP STATION EXTERNAL, 
SABOTAGE 
EXPLOSIVES, 
MECHANICAL 
TAMPERING, ARSON 
MEDIUM – 
DEPENDING ON 
ACCESS CONTROL 
AND DETECTION 
CAPABILITIES 
PUMP STATION EXTERNAL, VANDAL 
OR CRIMINAL 
GRAFFITI, PROPERTY 
DAMAGE, THEFT OR 
EQUIPMENT OR WIRE 
MEDIUM – 
DEPENDING ON 
FENCES AND ACCESS 
CONTROL 
PUMP STATION INTERNAL, 
DISGRUNTLED 
EMPLOYEE 
MECHANICAL 
TAMPERING OR 
ELECTRONIC PANELS 
HIGH – EMPLOYEES 
HAVE ACCESS, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 
 
TABLE 6: POTENTIAL ASSET/THREAT COMBINATIONS 
SOURCE: MODIFIED FROM (VAN LEUVEN, 2012, 45). 
 
 
 Additional examples of a physical threat to water infrastructure systems includes, 
but are not limited to the destruction of dams and distribution lines (Hickman, 1999, 1). 
                                                
31 For a SCADA Network attack Scenario, please refer to Appendix 5 
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Given that provinces under their own emergency management legislation32 are tasked with 
protecting their critical infrastructure (Sauder, 2010, 14), it will be absolutely necessary for 
the City of Toronto (Utilities) and the Province to increase their partnership in continuing 
to secure the water and wastewater treatment facilities with a view to take into account the 
evolving threat landscape. To date, it appears as though the province or the federal 
government does not mandate vulnerability assessments specifically to the water sector in 
Canada (Sauder, 2010, 14). Interestingly enough, the United States is much different, 
including mandated vulnerability assessments, rigorous guidelines, and regulated security 
upgrades, each of which further contributes to improved disaster resilience (Katen, 2004, 
16). 
4B.5.  SUMMARY OF THOUGHTS 
 Thus far, this work has discussed water security issues, the water infrastructure 
system, and the known biological, chemical, cyber and physical threats from a conventional 
terrorism studies perspective. It is important to recognize that these threats were not 
discussed in any type of chronological manner. It would be rather contentious to indicate 
that any one of these threats is more important than the other. Instead, the author 
recommends being mindful of how each may overlap and further to this, how the dynamic 
environment of the twenty-first century requires vigilance of a multitude of threat sources, 
some of which may be the result of poor planning. 
 The accidental discovery of vials of smallpox in a lab in the National Institute of 
Health in the United States in July 2014 prompted a ‘hunt’ for other highly poisonous 
substances (BBC, 2014) that may not have been stored properly. During this ‘hunt’, vials of 
                                                
32 In Ontario, this would be the Ontario Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act 
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poisonous substances including the plague, botulism and a rare tropical infection (BBC, 
2014) were found. Although they had been safely sealed, officials had found that these 
deadly microbes were not stored properly, likely because they were part of a historical 
collection that was once allowed to be stored without regulation! (BBC, 2014). Incidents 
such as this probe further questions: how often does this happen? How many incidents 
similar to this have occurred that have not been reported? How many still exist? If no 
storage regulations exist for those microbes, how can one know if any vials are missing? 
One can ask endless questions on this matter, but the point here is rather simple: if 
something like this can happen (in the U.S.A. of all places!), what is the probability and 
possibility of it happening somewhere else?33 
 Again, this work is not about casting fear, uncertainty or doubt. It is about the 
identification and awareness of security issues within water infrastructure systems that exist 
in the dynamic threat environment of the twenty-first century. In Donald Rumsfeld’s 
words, we are currently living in a time of “unknown unknowns,” that is, ignorances which 
we do not even know we are ignorant of. Somewhere, someone may have already beaten us 
in a battle we had no idea we were fighting (Chatfield, 2012). It is exactly for this reason 
that Canada must further develop its means to secure its infrastructure. 
PART C: CASE STUDIES 
 
As both Table 1 and Appendix 1 illustrate, there has been a long history of attacking 
water systems. This chapter will therefore bring to the forefront case studies on Milwaukee, 
and the Maroochy Wastewater Treatment Plant in Australia.  
 
                                                
33 This question is of course, not limited to the discovery of biological microbes, but also to an array of other 
information or material. For example, improper chemical storage, improper password storage, improper 
equipment usage, etc. 
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4C. 1 MILWAUKEE 
 
During the months of March and April of 1993, Milwaukee experienced the largest 
epidemic of waterborne disease in U.S. history (Infectious Disease News, 2007, 1). 
Beginning on March 23rd, hospitals and schools in Milwaukee began reporting staffing 
issues to the city’s Department of Public Health when, suddenly, a large number of both 
nurses and teachers called in sick. During the initial two week period, it is estimated that 
approximately “403,000 people reported sudden acute watery diarrhea”  (25% of the city’s 
population) (Infectious Disease News, 2007, 1). In addition to this, approximately 100 
people died of this waterborne outbreak, which was later identified as cryptosporidium – a 
protozoan parasite that causes gastrointestinal illness (Corso, et al, 2003, 426-431). 
Although an increase in the water’s turbidity was noticed at the city’s Howard 
Avenue Treatment Plant, along with a large decline in the number of students at school 
(Gradus, Singh, and Sedmak 1994, 57-60) in late March, it was not until additional 
complaints reached the Department of Health on April 5th that tests had commenced. 
Finally, on April 7th, the Mayor ordered a boil water advisory to the city after laboratory 
tests confirmed cryptosporidium in the city’s water (MacKenzie, et al. 1995, 57-62). 
According to Gradus, Singh and Sedmark, residents of Milwaukee had consistently 
made contact with the city’s water department, where complaints of cloudy, foul-smelling 
water was met by utility workers depositing more chlorine into the system in an attempt to 
fix the issue (Gradus, Singh, and Sedmak 1994, 57-60). Being resistant to chlorine, this 
attempt did not aid the problem at hand, but instead increased the length of time that the 
population was exposed to the parasite. 
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Although this incident was not an intentional attack per se34, it is significant to this 
work in that it illustrates a population that was acutely vulnerable to a parasite as a result of 
poor monitoring and identification methods35. This particular parasite had entered the city’s 
Howard Avenue Treatment Plant through an intake pipe in Lake Michigan, and by the time 
water utility workers understood what was going on, it was already too late: approximately 
25% of the population fell ill, with 100 fatalities. Since this incident however, Milwaukee 
has become the leader in water quality in the United States (Golden, 2013, 1). 
4C. 2 MAROOCHY WASTEWATER TREATMENT PLANT 
 From approximately February 9th to April 23rd of 2000, the Maroochy Wastewater 
Treatment Plant in Australia (approximately 100 kilometers North of Brisbane), utility 
workers had experienced a series of faults in the SCADA system of the plant (Weiss, 2010, 
111). The individual behind the series of disruptions was a former site supervisor of Hunter 
Watertech who resigned from his position and approached the city council seeking 
employment (Weiss, 2010, 111). Infuriated with the city for turning down his job 
application, Vitek Boden decided to take matters into his own hands. 
 Utilizing stolen radio and computer equipment, Boden was able to successfully 
sabotage the control systems of the Plant, resulting in approximately 800,000 litres of 
                                                
34 A few weeks after the outbreak, the public had learned that the operators of the city’s Howard Avenue 
Treatment Plant had lost full control of the treatment process in late March, which allowed the 
Cryptosporidium to break through the filters. The operators did not pay attention to the indicators of changing 
water quality that were in place at the time. The pathogen had been going through the city’s water mains for 
more than two weeks before the boil-water advisory was announced (Behm, 2013). 
35 “Today, the turbidity, or cloudiness, of filtered water is measured constantly inside the plants. Turbidity is 
an indicator of the concentration of particles of all kinds suspended in water. Before April 1993, operators 
collected just one sample of water every eight hours from treated water in storage to be checked for turbidity. 
No one checked water leaving the filters. No particle counters were installed at either plant before the 
outbreak. Now, there are particle counters on each filter. They provide minute-by-minute counts of anything 
floating in filtered water and report the number of particles of different sizes, including a range of 3 to 5 
microns that might indicate the presence of Crypto…From 1994 through 1998, the Water Works invested $89 
million to upgrade the two filtration plants and bolster barriers to contamination of drinking water” (Behm, 
2013). 
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untreated sewage released from various parts of the Maroochy Plant resulting in death to 
marine life, and the nearby creek water turning black with a stench that remained 
unbearable for residents (Abrams and Weiss, 2008, 8). 
 As indicated above, Boden had achieved his actions with a stolen radio and 
computer equipment. He was able to disable alarms at four pumping stations (Weiss, 2010, 
111). While a Hunter Watertech investigator was attempting to troubleshoot the system, he 
had noticed that the log indicated that the program had been run at least thirty-one times. 
As a result of Boden’s success in disabling the alarms at the selected stations, his actions 
went unnoticed for a period of time (Weiss, 2010, 111).  
Unlike the previous two case studies, this is one which portrays deliberate and 
malicious intent. Internationally speaking, this incident represented one of the first 
successful SCADA system attacks. Moreover, it illustrates the capability of an individual 
with skilled knowledge to cause widespread disruption and damage from the outside.  
PART D:  INTERVIEWS 
4D.1 INTRODUCTION TO SUBJECTS INTERVIEWED  
 
 Although much information has been obtained through the use of secondary 
sources, it is necessary to engage individuals within the field of security to truly understand 
if there is an imminent threat as well as the controversies situated in the threat environment. 
In an attempt to do that, contact was attempted with a number of representatives from: 
• Toronto Water Integrated Technology Management Unit 
• R.C. Harris Treatment Plant 
• Defense Research and Development Canada – Suffield 
• Biology Professors 
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• Chemistry Professors 
• Carleton University Infrastructure Protection Program 
• Public Safety Canada 
• Ontario Clean Water Association 
• The Pacific Institute (Think Tank) 
Perhaps as a result of the sensitivity of the issue that was being discussed, the vast majority 
of those contacted either did not respond, or, offered referrals to other individuals who also 
did not respond. Of the many that were contacted, three individuals agreed to be part of the 
discussion. 
• Joseph Weiss PE, CISM, CRISC, ISA Fellow, IEEE Senior Member, Applied 
Control Solutions, LLC (U.S.A.)  
• Michael Goedeker, Sophos, HAKDEFNET (Computer & Network Security) 
(U.S.A.)  
• An anonymous source from outside of Canada (Water: Business Strategy and 
Resilience) (personal responses). 
4D.2 COMPARISONS, CONTROVERSIES AND DISCREPANCIES 
 
The discussions with the participants of this study focused on whether or not current 
water infrastructure systems were at risk to either a physical, chemical, biological or a 
cyber attack.  
In general, each of the individuals agreed that critical infrastructure is vulnerable to 
attack. For example, Joe Weiss argued that there are always “three legs to security”: 
physical security, IT security and ICS security. However, despite current attempts, all ICS 
(Industrial Control Systems, i.e. SCADA) are vulnerable to cyber attacks, no matter what 
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industry they are in (Weiss, 2014; Weiss, 2010). As a result of this, contamination of 
various parts of the water infrastructure system are in fact possible. Although this is quite 
comparable to what has been illustrated in this work thus far, the anonymous source 
brought in an interesting perspective as well. 
 In discussing risk and vulnerability of water infrastructure systems, the anonymous 
source believed that water systems are at risk of attack from malware, insiders, hackers, 
terrorist organizations, etc, especially in recognition of environmental change that may or 
may not create security issues themselves for water resources (Anonymous, 2014). This 
individual went on to state that the risk for water systems is more likely at the consumer 
end as the volume of contaminate required to conduct an attack at the bulk water end is 
much too great: the dilution effect mitigates the risk (Anonymous, 2014). When asked 
about the specific threats towards water infrastructures, the individual responded by citing 
that water supplies have been targeted for well over 2000 years (Anonymous, 2014). While 
modern systems are reasonably robust, and have redundancy built in for regular 
maintenance purposes, this individual recognizes that the cyber risk is increasing as 
organizations move to Internet based control and monitoring (Anonymous, 2014). 
On the specific subject of the risks of a chemical or biological attack on the water 
infrastructure, the individual assessed the risk to be low for the sheer reason that better 
outcomes can be achieved by using the available resources to target mass crowds, for 
example, on railways or at sporting events (Anonymous, 2014). 
Regarding the challenges in protecting water infrastructure, the individual again 
focused on the issue of cyber attacks becoming a larger issue in the long term as it would 
be possible to cause extensive damage in changing the dosage of chemicals, or as another 
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example, suddenly closing valves (Anonymous, 2014). The risk with this being that water 
systems have mass energy in moving water that ‘does not go well’ with sudden valve 
closers, which would result in thousands of tones of pressure impacting the system. 
While on the subject of risk, this individual was also asked to shed light on how Al 
Qaeda’s attempts to obtain information related to SCADA water systems has changed the 
way in which water infrastructures are secured. The individual’s response indicated that 
post 9/11, water companies globally undertook extensive upgrades at key nodes such as 
treatment plants. However, as alluded to earlier on in this work, it is not possible to have a 
secure pipe network given the nature of the distribution system (Anonymous, 2014).  
Taking into consideration all that has been said, Michael Goedecker was asked to speak 
to the topic of hacking. Without hesitation, Mr. Goedecker explained that there were six 
common steps most attackers use to find and exploit vulnerabilities in a given system. They 
 include the following:
 
FIGURE 8: HACKING – COMMON STEPS IN AN ATTACK 
SOURCE: (GOEDECKER, 2014).  
1. 
• Creation of reason / Goal of the hacker 
• REASON 
2. 
• Getting information of target, understanding how the business works 
• INTEL 
3. 
• Scan for vulnerabilities, compare to existing exploits (Metasploit-DB) 
• SCAN, PREP ATTACK SURFACE 
4. 
• Attack target based on vulnerabilties, search for info and achieve goal 
• ATTACK, STEAL AND MAINTAIN ACCESS 
5. 
• After achieving goal, monitor, plant false tracks and plant traps 
• MAINTAIN ACCESS, ANTI-FORENSICS 
6. 
• Sell data or use to damage target to profit from theft (based on motivation) 
• ATTAIN GOAL OF HACK (MONEY, RECOGNITION, DAMAGE) 
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 In recognition of this, Goedecker also went on to explain a similar idea expressed 
by Weiss: layered security. He explained, “when we understand that a multiple layered 
security strategy must complement those processes and assets then we are able to fit the 
right tools and mechanisms to protect any given layer correctly” (Goedecker, 2014). 
 Considering each of the individual’s responses, it appears that they have a similar 
attitude regarding the security of the water infrastructure systems: it is vulnerable to attack. 
Where discrepancies emerge is on the topic of risk. At this point, it appears as though 
Weiss and the Anonymous source agree that the systems are vulnerable, but the 
Anonymous source maintains the view that the risk of an attack is low, based on the 
grounds that there are more efficient ways of obtaining mass casualties. 
PART E: SUMMARY 
This chapter has analyzed some of the threats that water infrastructure systems are 
plagued with, and has also explored two case studies relevant to the conventional terrorist 
threat to water infrastructure systems. In particular, the Milwaukee case study illustrates 
that it may in fact be easier than expected to attack water infrastructure systems. 
Additionally, this also sheds light on two important factors: human fallibility and lack of 
effective monitoring. Although this case study is not one that clearly exemplifies any intent 
of malicious activity, conventional terrorism studies would likely draw attention to the ease 
at which this parasite got through the mechanisms that were suppose to identify it. It is here 
where contagion propagates and potential malevolent actors may attempt to recreate this 
scene at another location.  
The incident at the Maroochy wastewater treatment plant is a clear example of 
water infrastructure infiltrated by a malevolent individual, Vitek Boden. Unlike the incident 
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in Milwaukee, this incident had been carried out with malicious intent, as an act of 
retribution. In this case, conventional terrorism studies would analyze the ‘us versus them’ 
perspective that it adheres to as a means to explain the reasons behind the incident. Boden 
would ultimately be viewed as an unstable individual who took matters into his own hands. 
 In considering each incident, it is important to take a step back and understand how 
conventional terrorism studies would perceive either of these. In particular, Milwaukee 
does not contain the typical malicious individual(s) that conventional terrorism studies 
acknowledge as necessary to refer to an incident as a ‘terrorist attack’. In this regard, 
Milwaukee would likely be observed as an accident, unless it can be proven that operators 
of the Milwaukee water treatment plant had malicious intent.  
The case of Maroochy however, would likely be the complete opposite. Given the 
presence of an individual with malicious intent – conventional terrorism studies would also 
likely argue that Boden was mentally unstable – it is much easier for this incident to be 
viewed as a ‘terrorist attack’.  This is because conventional terrorism studies asserts a very 
narrow scope of what defines terrorism. It is not ‘us’, it is ‘them’, and if ‘they’ are not on 
‘our’ side, ‘they’ can only be against ‘us’36. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
36 Quite similar to George W. Bush’s proclamation you’re either with us or against us in his post 9/11 
speech. 
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CHAPTER 5          CRITICAL TERRORISM STUDIES  
PERSPECTIVE ON WATER SECURITY 
 
5.1 VIGILANCE 
The case studies in the previous section have drawn attention to vulnerability, and 
therefore, the need to be vigilant. Often, the possibility of incidents occurring is associated 
with the probability of such an incident to transpire. The reality however, is possibility and 
probability are two terms that are independent of each other. While vigilance is required to 
ensure that water infrastructure systems are not attacked, there are other concerns that 
surround water infrastructure, such as the neglect to maintain it. 
Again, perspectives on terrorism are immensely subjective. The essence of critical 
terrorism studies however, depicts the notion of defeating terrorism through addressing its 
root causes. Addressing the root causes of terrorism is undoubtedly a difficult task that will 
require more than just understanding moral justification, and it is in no way a short-term 
task.  Instead it is a task that will require long-term resources and effort to understand one 
of the most crucial questions that critical terrorism studies attempts to answer: why? Why 
this individual? Why now? Why did he/she choose that target? Furthermore, trying to 
understand this through the lens of one’s personal beliefs will only subvert an already 
subjective issue thereby creating bias, which is why the interdisciplinary nature of critical 
terrorism studies is significant. The end state is to decrease the frequency and severity of 
attacks. The interdisciplinary nature of critical terrorism studies communicates this well 
within its work, which is why it is employed here. 
This chapter will focus on critical studies of terrorism, and will therefore consider 
the perspective of water infrastructure failing as a result of a number of causes, coupled 
  G. CIOFFI     46 
 
 
with a broader perspective of how terrorism is perceived.  Additionally, it will also consider 
alternate forms of water infrastructure that may limit the vulnerability of the current water 
infrastructure systems in place. 
5.2 WALKERTON 
 In May 2000, the town of Walkerton experienced an outbreak of a biological agent 
(E-coli). The outcome of this tragedy included “more than 2,300 individuals who 
experienced gastroenteritis, 65 who were hospitalized, 27 that had developed haemolytic 
uraemic syndrome (HUS; a serious and potentially fatal kidney ailment), and seven died” 
(Hrudey, et al, 2003, 7-14).  
 Similar to the Milwaukee incident, this case study is not the result of a deliberate 
attack, but it identified large-scale failures in the management of a water treatment plant. 
Instead of alerting the public health authority of the presence of e-coli in the water, 
distribution was switched from the well contaminated with e-coli to a well that did not have 
a chlorinator, but was thought to be safe (Hrudey, et al, 2003, 7-14). Moreover, this 
incident clearly outlines the reality that handling a contamination before it reaches the 
public is severely lacking. 
 As indicated above, the public health authority was not made aware of the presence 
of e-coli in the city’s water. The rationale of this stems from reforms in environmental 
governance that had been introduced by the provincial government under Mike Harris 
following the election of 1995 (Prudham, 2003, 2). According to Scott Prudham, “this 
tragedy is an example of broad regulatory failure and the systematic production of 
environmental risks by neoliberal governance reforms” (Prudham, 2003, 2). Harris Ali 
supports this notion: 
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In the case of the Walkerton municipality, such resource limitations were exacerbated 
because of the trickle-down effect of government imposed budget cuts to the Ministry 
of Environment (MOE) in 1996. Forced to work on a reduced budget, the MOE 
introduced certain changes related to the monitoring and oversight of drinking water 
supplies—changes that had significant impacts on the disaster incubation in 
Walkerton. First, whereas previously the MOE laboratories had conducted all routine 
drinking water tests for municipal water systems throughout the province, with the 
imposed budget restrictions, such testing was to be completed by private laboratories 
hired by the individual municipality. Consequently, the municipality was forced to 
assume the costs of this privatized testing (Ali, 2004, 2607). 
 
Essentially, with the municipality assuming these new costs the capacity of regulatory 
agencies in the Ontario government were being undermined, thereby creating regulatory 
gaps that reckoned Walkerton a ‘normal accident’37 of neoliberalism (Prudham, 2003, 2).  
In sum, the provincial government had removed itself from the responsibility of 
water management (quality control), and did not introduce any certification program or 
procedures of notification for the private labs to follow – effectively leaving the province 
without any type of “groundwater protection, management plan, or binding water quality 
standards” (Prudham, 2003, 9). Previously, this work had indicated that within the 
distribution system, there is a lack of any ability to handle a contamination before it 
reaches the public. The perspectives offered by Ali and Prudham hold an alternative 
perspective on this matter and compels one to reconsider the threats to water infrastructure. 
Additionally, it may even go a step further and force a dialogue on exactly what constitutes 
state terrorism. Analyzing this case study from such perspective essentially creates more 
questions than it answers. Is this a viable example of terrorism? Or does this qualify more 
as criminal negligence?  
 As discussed in the Overview of this work, Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) 
addresses the role of states and government agencies in using violence against their own 
                                                
37 A term coined by Charles Perrow, ‘Normal Accidents’ to describe catastrophic failures in systems whose 
characteristics make such events inevitable (Perrow 1999; Prudham, 2003, 3). 
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citizens, or citizens of foreign countries (Lutz, 2010, 31). Given this, it is of use to question 
how the events of Walkerton may be viewed from the perspective of CTS. If not anything 
else, Walkerton demonstrates a great need for rethinking the maintenance of water 
infrastructure. There is no doubt that water infrastructure is in a deteriorating condition. In 
Toronto, bursting water mains have become quite a common occurrence, with an average 
of 1,400 water main breaks annually38 as a result of mechanical or structural failure39 (City 
of Toronto, 2014b). Bearing this, CTS may investigate the grounds on whether or not this is 
in fact ‘state terrorism’. Certainly, terrorism is a perplexing topic in and of itself, but it is 
critical to note that it does not stipulate individuals being subject to attack. There is an 
array of variables to consider. Taking into context the events of Walkerton as they have 
been presented by the Media, and how both Ali and Prudham have presented them, one can 
make an informed decision, cognizant of both perspectives, on how – if at all – 
privatization and neoliberalization have a role in state terrorism.  
 As previously indicated, Walkerton demonstrates a great need for rethinking the 
maintenance of water infrastructure systems. Generally speaking, much of the water 
infrastructure system is located underground, which makes fixing any issues troublesome 
and expensive to say the least. One scheme that would perhaps allow for a more sustainable 
approach to part of the infrastructure includes sustainable stormwater management – a 
scheme that focuses attention on natural solutions that would “combine function and 
performance with environmental, economic, and social benefits” (Wang, 2014, ii). It is 
understood that such a scheme would include the use of ‘low impact development’ such as 
                                                
38 “North York, Scarborough and Etobicoke experience the highest break rates as their water mains are 
located in predominantly clay soil as opposed to sand” (City of Toronto, 2014b) 
39 The main factors responsible for water main deterioration and failure are: external corrosion, wall 
thickness, and temperature (prolonged periods of cold). For a full list, see (City of Toronto, 2014b). 
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green roofs, permeable surfaces40 and planting more trees that absorb more water (Wang, 
2014, 5-8). Not only would implementing a sustainable plan be beneficial to the 
environment, but it would also be less prone to failure and create less vulnerability for the 
water infrastructure system (waste) as a whole, which would moreover make the 
infrastructure less of an ideal target for terrorist attacks.  
 In her work, Wang puts forward the argument that urban areas have become 
dependent on engineered infrastructures (Wang, 2014, 11; Jones and Macdonald, 2007, 
536). More and more, these engineered infrastructures continue to be placed under 
increasing demands and pressure as cities grow (Wang, 2014, 12). The sheer cost of 
replacing or fixing infrastructure can be quite challenging for smaller municipalities 
(Wang, 2014, 12), which may push some to “replace aged systems with a more integrated 
approach to accomplish multiple goals in water supply and waste water management while 
realizing cost benefits” (Donofrio et al, 2009, 180). Furthermore, this has triggered 
alternate forms of water management that focus on long-term sustainability, resilience, and 
cost efficiency: low impact development. This strategy is an “integrated water management 
system that encompasses low-impact design, water conservation and recycling, water 
quality management, and urban ecology” (Donofrio et al, 2009, 179). 
 This strategy seeks to utilize sustainable methods as an alternate approach to 
traditional water infrastructure systems that can be costly to repair. It seeks to improve 
water quality characteristics “by increasing retention, detention, infiltration, and treatment 
of stormwater runoff at its source” (Donofrio et al, 2009, 183) in opposition to directing 
runoff off-site as quickly as possible through both structural and non-structural means 
                                                
40 For example, “permeable or fractured bedrock may store higher volumes of water in comparison to 
bedrock that has minor fractures and stores small volumes of water for short periods. Depending on the 
connectivity of the bedrock, it may even funnel the water into subsurface storage” (Wang, 5, 2014). 
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(Wang, 2014, 13-16). The benefit of adopting such a strategy would not only be cost 
effective, but could potentially decrease the vulnerability of water infrastructure systems as 
a whole. However, it is important to note here, that removing a “hard target” such as the 
engineered systems that make up the current water infrastructure systems does not 
completely solve the problem of vulnerability, but instead makes the system more 
decentralized, which decreases the risk of an attack from occurring. Essentially, there are 
pros and cons to any solution that deals with critical infrastructure.  
The strategy of low impact development would greatly benefit the environment, and 
significantly decrease risk.  However, it may also transfer the responsibility of risk 
reduction directly to the individual. Depending how the system is implemented, the onus of 
water security may fall to individual households, similar to how households on well water 
and septic tanks are responsible for ensuring the safety of their own water. Additionally, it 
is also important to question if this would be a viable option to distribute and collect water 
to other critical infrastructures that depend on large amounts of water, as well as those 
industries whose waste-water contains toxic material that may disrupt the ecosystem it is a 
part of. Given this, it is imperative to understand that there are risks to any system that will 
be put in place, which is why it is crucial for each municipality to determine the level of 
risk it is willing to accept, and from there, to determine which system best suits its needs. 
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CHAPTER 6                CONCLUSION: AUTHOR’S ASSESSMENT 
 The majority of this work has assessed water management and the risk of terrorist 
attacks from a conventional terrorism studies perspective. From that perspective, this work 
has discussed the systems involved in the treatment of water and wastewater, and how each 
of the processes can be vulnerable to a biological, chemical, cyber or physical attack. 
Moreover, it has also shed light on how each of these threats may be realized, and has also 
utilized case studies and professional interviews to bring forward various perspectives, 
discrepancies or controversies on this subject. 
 As a way forward, it will be critical for water utilities to be mindful of the evolving 
threat landscape, especially since much of the older water infrastructure systems were not 
built with security as an objective (Van Leuven, 2011, 41). As it currently stands, it would 
appear that the current water infrastructure in Toronto remains vulnerable at a number of 
points, especially within the distribution system, and perhaps even the treatment facilities. 
However, as the individuals interviewed have suggested, the risk to water infrastructure is 
low at the moment.  How risk is perceived is dependent on the threat factors that one is 
assessing. The case studies in this work have illustrated that threats can occur from a range 
of sources, and can be intentional or unintentional.  
But in addition, using critical terrorism studies perspective, one can question ones 
definition of ‘terrorism’ suggesting that negligence to maintain and alter such infrastructure 
may or may not contribute to “terror”. I am not alluding to a notion of ‘state terror’ against 
its own citizenry, but instead calling into question the entire definition of terrorism, and 
pointing to the necessity to consider a number of definitions and theories when trying to 
unravel this term. 
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 Whether or not there is a legitimate threat to water infrastructure via terrorism 
depends on how one defines terrorism –whether from the conventional (traditional 
dominant) views of terrorism, or from the Critical Terrorism Studies perspective presented 
in this work. As such, it is essential to take precaution in analyzing what constitutes a 
threat, and how such a threat may be realized. Threats may not be limited to an imminent 
occurrence, and as such one must consider a number of scenarios and perspectives as a 
means of precaution, in an attempt to understand the threat environment.  
 Alas, it would be erroneous to state that threats are limited to biological, chemical, 
physical and cyber attacks. As the case studies have demonstrated, there are other matters 
of concern. Privatization initiatives and neoliberal reforms, such as illustrated in Walkerton, 
as well as a number of water main bursts in Toronto are prime examples that illustrate the 
need to tackle the problem in its entirety, as opposed to simply putting a ‘band aid’ on the 
issue.  
Essentially, the author believes that while Toronto’s current water infrastructure is 
clearly vulnerable, assessing its risk is quite fluid in that it may change with how critical 
the system is to its location, the effect the adversary wishes to achieve, and on the 
recognisability (public significance) of the system. To date, the recognized tool amongst 
critical infrastructure professionals in assessing risk is the use of the CARVER matrix. This 
matrix is provided below and is further explained in Appendix 6. 
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FIGURE 9: CARVER MATRIX41 
SOURCE: (BIRKETT, ET AL, 2011, 467). 
Additionally, as a means to understand the range of threats that water systems may 
confront, employees at the utility must also recognize the types of adversaries, malevolent 
persons, or groups that may attempt to obstruct the utility from performing any one of its 
essential functions (Van Leuven, 2011, 33). This knowledge, or intelligence, would overall 
allow the utilities to construct a ‘comprehensive threat profile’ (Van Leuven, 2011, 33) as a 
critical factor in its risk calculation. However, the author also recognizes that the largest 
challenge in any circumstance is funding. Given that the number of incidents is not very 
high, in addition to the perceived attack immunity, putting more money toward a program 
that would increase the utilities’ resilience to attacks may not be something we will see in 
the near future. Perhaps “the only trigger to change will be when, not if, an attack happens” 
(Sauder, 2010, 20). 
                                                
41 “The CARVER selection factors assist in selecting the best targets or components to attack. As the factors 
are considered, they are given a numerical value. This value represents the desirability of attacking the target. 
The values are then placed in a decision matrix. After CARVER values for each target or component are 
assigned, the sum of the values indicate the highest value target or component to be attacked” (U.S. 
Government, 1991, Appendix D). For additional information, please refer to Appendix 6. 
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 Should an incident happen, whether it is accidental or intentional, a plan must be in 
place. Perhaps the most sensitive of issues would arise if a ‘terrorist attack’ on any water 
infrastructure system occurs. After 9/11, one of the first acts of retaliation in Canada 
occurred in Hamilton, where individuals set fire to a Hindu Temple (The Canadian Press, 
2013). Not only did this unfortunate incident insinuate ignorance, it also drew attention to 
the community divide that immediately occurred soon after the attacks. As such, it is 
imperative that community education and outreach is available to ensure the fight and 
marginalization is not brought to innocent people. 
 The first chapter of this work brought forward two theories of terrorism: 
conventional (traditional) terrorism studies and critical terrorism studies. While both 
theories contribute to the ongoing study of terrorism, one must be mindful that terrorism is 
a dynamic subject, amorphous in structure. Individually, each theory will leave gaps in the 
ongoing study of this subject. For this reason, it is essential for both traditional and critical 
terrorism scholars to work together in the long term, with a view to come to grips with this 
thing called terrorism.  
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APPENDIX 1                                     
 
APPENDIX 1:  SELECTION OF HISTORICAL WATER THREATS AND INCIDENTS 
SOURCE: ADAPTED DIRECTLY FROM (BIRKETT, ET AL, 2011, 459). 
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APPENDIX 2                           
 
APPENDIX 2: TORONTO WATER TREATMENT PLANT 2013 STATISTICS 
SOURCE: ADAPTED DIRECTLY FROM (CITY OF TORONTO, 2014) 
 
R.C. HARRIS WATER TREATMENT PLANT 2013 STATISTICS 
TOTAL ANNUAL PLANT WATER PRODUCED 148,380 MILLION LITRES 
PERCENTAGE OF PLANT WATER PRODUCED 
TO THE OVERALL SYSTEM 
34% 
NUMBER OF DAYS THE PLANT OPERATED 349 DAYS 
AVERAGE DAILY PRODUCTION 407 MILLION LITRES 
MAXIMUM DAY’S PRODUCTION 689 MILLION LITRES 
DATE OF MAXIMUM WATER PRODUCTION MARCH 5, 2013 
 
F.J. HORGAN WATER TREATMENT PLANT 2013 STATISTICS 
RATED CAPACITY     800 MILLION LITRES CONVEYED PER DAY 
TOTAL ANNUAL PLANT WATER PRODUCED 87,364 MILLION LITRES 
PERCENTAGE OF PLANT WATER PRODUCED 
TO THE OVERALL SYSTEM 
20% 
NUMBER OF DAYS THE PLANT OPERATED  365 DAYS 
AVERAGE DAILY PRODUCTION       239 MILLION LITRES/DAY 
MAXIMUM DAY'S PRODUCTION 483 MILLION LITRES 
DATE OF MAXIMUM WATER PRODUCTION DECEMBER 2, 2013 
 
R.L. CLARK WATER TREATMENT PLANT 2013 STATISTICS 
 
ISLAND WATER TREATMENT PLANT 2013 STATISTICS 
TOTAL ANNUAL PLANT WATER PRODUCED  87,947 MILLION LITRES 
PERCENTAGE OF PLANT WATER PRODUCED 
TO THE OVERALL SYSTEM 
20% 
NUMBER OF DAYS THE PLANT OPERATED 341 DAYS 
AVERAGE DAILY PRODUCTION 254 MILLION LITRES 
MAXIMUM DAY'S PRODUCTION 354 MILLION LITRES 
DATE OF MAXIMUM WATER PRODUCTION JULY 18, 2013 
 
 
TOTAL ANNUAL PLANT WATER PRODUCED 115,015 MILLION LITRES 
PERCENTAGE OF PLANT WATER PRODUCED 
TO THE OVERALL SYSTEM 
26% 
NUMBER OF DAYS THE PLANT OPERATED 348 DAYS 
AVERAGE DAILY PRODUCTION 328 MILLION LITRES 
MAXIMUM DAY'S PRODUCTION 473 MILLION LITRES 
DATE OF MAXIMUM WATER PRODUCTION JULY 19, 2013 
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APPENDIX 3                                                
 
COMPOUNDS OF CONCERN FOR DRINKING WATER SECURITY 
SOURCE: ADAPTED DIRECTLY FROM (KROLL, 2013, 8-9) 
 
HEAVY METALS:  Heavy metals are agents of concern due to their toxicity to humans.  
They are also fairly easy to obtain, and their salts tend to be readily soluble 
HERBICIDES:  While as a general class, herbicides tend to be less detrimental to human 
health than some other compounds; there are some notable exceptions.  This, along with the 
ability to easily obtain large quantities of these chemicals from agricultural supply sources, 
adds to the concern.  Even if few fatalities resulted, the panic caused by the introduction of 
herbicide type compounds into a water system could be severe. 
INSECTICIDES:  Insecticides tend to be more harmful to human health than herbicides.  
Some of the insecticides have chemical structures quite similar to some of the chemical 
warfare nerve agents, and there are several that are cholinesterase inhibitors.  Like 
herbicides, insecticides are also readily available in large quantities.  For some, their 
solubility limits their usefulness as water introduced weapons, but others are quite soluble 
and present more of a threat.   
NEMATOCIDES AND RODENTICIDES:  Nematocides are similar to insecticides.  They, with 
some exceptions, do tend to be more soluble than insecticides.  Some nematocide 
compounds are also similar to chemical warfare agents in structure and mode of action.  
Rodenticides are of concern because they are specifically designed to be lethal to 
mammalian species such as humans.  Both classes are readily available in large quantities.   
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS AND MISCELLANEOUS AGENTS:  There are any number of industrial 
chemicals that could be used in an attack.  Chief among these is cyanide, which is widely 
used in mining and other industries.   
ILLEGAL DRUGS:  Illegal drugs are not widely recognized as a potential threat.  Street drugs, 
such as LSD, GHB, PCP and heroin, among others, are a mode of attack that could be 
employed.  Some drugs, such as LSD, are easily synthesized in a home lab.  Other drugs, 
such as heroin, are widely available.  While the cost could be prohibitive for individuals 
working alone, supplies do exist for well-organized and funded groups.   Also, it should 
be noted that a large portion of the illegal opiates (such as heroin) finding their way into the 
US come from areas such as West Asia where the terrorist cells often control this trade.   
RADIONUCLIDES: The use of radionuclides as a terror weapon is a distinct possibility.  Even 
if casualties were low, the psychological impact of a radiological threat could be severe.  
Obtaining high purity, highly radioactive material, such as plutonium or Uranium 238, is 
difficult, and it is unlikely that a terrorist organization that had obtained these materials 
would be inclined to use them in an attack on a water system.  More likely is the use of low 
level radioactive material or waste 
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COMMERCIAL PRODUCTS:  While not the weapons of choice for organized terrorists, lone 
saboteurs, the emotionally unstable or small groups may turn to easily obtained commercial 
products such as bug sprays or lawn chemicals.  Many of the active ingredients of these 
preparations are the same as the pesticides and herbicides already discussed.  The 
difference lies in the smaller proportion of active ingredients.  The vast majority of these 
compounds have inert ingredients listed as their main component.   
CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS: Chemical warfare agents such as VX, Soman, and Sarin 
along with older type chemical weapons such as Mustard Gas and Lewisite are not likely to 
be targeted against a water system due to their limited availability.  If they are used, it is 
more likely that any assault from these weapons will be via aerosol.  As the result of an 
aerosol attack it is possible and even likely that these agents could find their way into water 
supplies.   
TOXINS AND BIOAGENTS:  There are a number of protozoa, bacteria, viruses and toxins that 
could be utilized in an attack.   Many of these materials are extremely toxic with 
compounds such as botulinum toxin being some of the most toxic substances known.  
These types of materials are fairly easy to grow or extract from readily available sources.  
For example ricin is extracted from castor beans and abrin can be obtained form rosary 
peas. There are several examples of the elicit production of ricin by terrorists.  Bacteria can 
also be easily grown.  For an attack on water the production of these materials may be even 
simpler than for an aerosol attack as there is little need to modify the toxins to make them 
airborne. In fact even raw sewage could be used as a potential contaminant in a backflow or 
cross connection type attack. 
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APPENDIX 4                                                          
 
SCADA VULNERABILITIES 
ADOPTED DIRECTLY FROM (FABRO, 2012, 46-47).  
 
Vulnerabilities and SCADA System Availability  
To facilitate the alignment of vulnerabilities with threat and consequence, the study team 
determined that the common denial of service vulnerabilities resulted from: 
-Improper bounds checking for data inputs, resulting in buffer overflows that can be used to 
write into random or specific memory space  
-Improper session management leading to a uncontrollable unmanaged connection states -
Factory deployed emergency shutdown capability, allowing for shutdown or reboot once an 
undocumented password is used 
-Default reboot protocol, allowing an attacker to force system reboots ad infinitum -
Memory leaks on physical devices creating opportunities for extensive resource 
consumption -Embedded diagnostic utilities that can create resource consumption failures 
when activated during normal system operation (on-line)  
-Heap buffer overflows resulting in denial of service when excessively long data strings are 
submitted following valid packet streams 
-Unauthorized access to embedded device Web servers allowing for an adversary to set 
refresh rates so high it renders the user interface inoperable  
-Critical devices vulnerable to loading and executing corrupted firmware, resulting in a 
system malfunction and denial of service 
-Inappropriately programmed field equipment forced into sending bulk multicast network 
subscription messaging, thus flooding the network and preventing normal control 
communications  
-Various buffer overflow vulnerabilities resulting in the corruption (and non-functioning) 
of embedded device web pages and remote connection services (ftp, telnet, rsh etc) -
Various instances of NULL pointer dereferencing 
-Denial of service due to performance failures from service scans and enumeration, some 
resulting in system auto-restore to factory settings (and thus being rendered unusable in a 
production environment)  
 
Vulnerabilities and SCADA System Integrity  
To facilitate realignment of vulnerabilities with threat and consequence, the study team 
determined that the common integrity vulnerabilities resulted from: 
-Improper bounds checking for data inputs, resulting in buffer overflows that can be used to 
write into random or specific memory space and resulted in the creation of new users or the 
execution of arbitrary code  
-Hard-coded and/or known default passwords used for system administration -Inappropriate 
use of least privilege practices, allowing an attacker to exploit one system application to 
gain access into more authoritative ones 
-Embedded web services vulnerable to cross site scripting 
-Unrestricted file content uploads and no destination bounds checking 
-Various database and SQL injection vulnerabilities resulting in modification of operational 
data or creation unauthorized (but privileged) users  
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-Critical devices vulnerable to loading and executing modified firmware (with the intent to 
create new user accounts or remove credential requirements) 
-Lack of message authentication facilitating for various man-in-the-middle type of attacks -
Various buffers overflow vulnerabilities resulting in the modification of embedded device 
web pages and authorized host listings  
 
Vulnerabilities and SCADA System Confidentiality  
To facilitate realignment of vulnerabilities with threat and consequence, the study team 
determined that the common confidentiality vulnerabilities resulted from: 
-Plaintext communications between operator control environments and field devices, 
allowing for the extraction of credentials  
-Poor password obfuscation and client-side storage of authentication credentials -
Unsecured directory traversal vulnerabilities 
-Unauthenticated acquisition of user and system configurations direct from field devices 
and operator consoles  
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APPENDIX 5                                  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 5: SCADA NETWORK ATTACK SCENARIO 
SOURCE: ADAPTED FROM (ELLIS, ET AL,  2011, 295). 
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APPENDIX 6                                
 
6.1 CARVER MATRIX: The CARVER Matrix is a tool that can be utilized to determine 
which identified targets will have the ‘biggest payoff’ to the overall mission.  
 
SOURCE: ADAPTED DIRECTLY FROM (BIRKETT, ET AL, 2011, 467). 
“The CARVER factors and their assigned values are used to construct a CARVER matrix. 
This is a tool for rating the desirability of potential targets and wisely allocating attack 
resources…To construct the matrix, list the potential targets in the left column.  The Table 
below shoes a sample matrix for a bulk electric power supply facility” (U.S. ARMY, 1991, 
APPENDIX D). 
APPENDIX 6.2: COMPLETED CARVER MATRIX 
BULK ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY 
POTENTIAL TARGETS C A R V E R TOTAL 
FUEL TANKS 8 9 3 8 5 6 41 
FUEL PUMPS 8 6 2 10 5 3 34 
BOILERS 6 2 10 4 5 4 31 
TURBINES 8 6 10 7 5 9 45 
GENERATORS 4 6 10 7 5 9 41 
CONDENSERS 8 8 5 2 5 4 34 
FEED PUMPS 3 8 5 8 5 6 33 
CIR. WATER PUMPS 3 6 5 8 5 4 33 
GENERATOR STEP UP TRANSFORMER 10 10 10 9 5 9 53 
SOURCE: ADAPTED DIRECTLY FROM (U.S. ARMY, 1991, APPENDIX D). 
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APPENDIX 6.3: ASSIGNING VALUES TO THE CARVER MATRIX  
SOURCE: ADAPTED DIRECTLY FROM (U.S. ARMY, 1991, APPENDIX D). 
 
ASSIGNING CRITICALITY VALUES 
 
 
ASSIGNING ACCESSIBILITY VALUES 
 
 
 
ASSIGNING RECUPERABILITY VALUES 
 
 
ASSIGNING VULNERABILITY VALUES 
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ASSIGNING EFFECT VALUES 
 
 
ASSIGNING RECOGNIZABILITY VALUES 
 
 
 
“As each potential target is evaluated for each CARVER factor, enter the appropriate value 
into the matrix. Once all the potential targets have been evaluated, add the values for each 
potential target. . The sums represent the relative desirability of each potential target; this 
constitutes a prioritized list of targets” (U.S. ARMY, 1991, APPENDIX D).  
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APPENDIX 7 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITY 
SOURCE: (DHS, 2009, 5) 
 
 
SECURITY TOPIC INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY (IT) 
CONTROL SYSTEMS (ICS) 
ANTIVIRUS AND MOBILE 
CODE 
VERY COMMON; EASILY 
DEPLOYED AND UPDATED 
CAN BE VERY DIFFICLT DUE 
TO IMPACT ON ICS; LEGACY 
SYSTEMS CANNOT BE FIXED 
PATCH MANAGEMENT EASILY DEFINED; ENTERPRISE 
WIDE REMOTE AN 
AUTOMATED 
VERY LONG RUNWAY TO 
SUCCESSFUL PATCH INSTALL; 
OEM SPECIFICL MAY IMPACT 
PERFORMANCE 
TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT 
LIFETIME (OUTSOURCING) 
203 YEARS; MULTIPLE 
VEDORS; UBIQUITOUS 
UPGRADES 
10-20 YEARS; SAME VENDOR 
CYBER SECURITY TESTING 
AND AUDIT (METHODS) 
USE MODERN METHODS TESTING HAS TO BE TUNED 
TO SYSTEM; MODERN 
METHODS INAPPROPRIATE 
FOR ICS; FRAGILE 
EQUIPMENT BREAKS 
CHANGE MANAGEMENT REGULAR AND SCHEDULED; 
ALIGNED WITH MINIMUM-USE 
PERIODS 
STRATEGIC SCHEDULING; 
NON TRIVIAL PROCESS DUE 
TO IMPACT 
ASSET CLASSIFICATION COMMON PRACTICE AND 
DONE ANNUALLY; RESULTS 
DRIVE CYBER SECURITY 
EXPENDITURE 
ONLY PERFORMED WHEN 
OBLIGATED; CRITICAL ASSET 
PROTECTION ASSOCIATED 
WITH BUDGET COSTS 
INCIDENT RESPONSE AND 
FORENSICE 
EASILY DEVELOPED AND 
DEPLOYED; SOME 
REGULATORY 
REQUIREMENTS; EMBEDDED 
IN TECHNOLOGY 
UNCOMMON BEYOND SYSTEM 
RESUMPTION ACTIVITIES; NO 
FORENSICS BEYOND EVENT 
RE-CREATION 
PHYSICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 
POOR (OFFICE SYSTEMS) TO 
EXCELLENT (CRITICAL 
OPERATIONS SYSTEMS) 
EXCELLENT (OPERATIONS 
CENTERS; GUARDS, GATES, 
GUNS) 
SECURE SYSTEMS 
DEVELOPMENT 
INTEGRAL PART OF 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
USUALLY NOT AN INTEGRAL 
PART OF SYSTEMS 
DEVELOPMENT 
SECURITY COMPLIANCE LIMITED REGULATORY 
OVERSIGHT 
SPECIFIC REGULATORY 
GUIDANCE (SOME SECTORS) 
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APPENDIX 8 
 
PRIORITIES OF SECURITY 
SOURCE: (DHS, 2009, 5) 
 
SECURITY PRIORITIZATION FOR IT PROFESSIONALS 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY HIGH IMPORTANCE 
INTEGRITY HIGH IMPORTANCE 
AVAILABILITY LOWER IMPORTANCE 
 
SECURITY PRIORITIZATION FOR ICS OPERATORS 
 
AVAILABILITY VERY HIGH IMPORTANCE 
INTEGRITY MEDIUM IMPORTANCE 
CONFIDENTIALITY LOW IMPORTANCE 
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